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ABSTRACT

R&D investment strategies of firms: renewal or abandonment
A real options perspective
BY
Pingping Song
July, 2009

Committee Chair:

William C. Bogner, Pamela S. Barr

Major Academic Unit:

Managerial Sciences

This research develops a real options perspective framework for firms‘ valuation of
strategic investments. I propose that a real options perspective can provide an effective means of
re-examining and revising firms‘ strategic investment decisions in general, and of making
individual, investment-level abandonment decisions in particular. The principal purposes of this
research are to explore whether firms make abandonment decisions in accordance with real
options theory, and the relative strength of the traditional economic theory, the behavioral theory
of the firm and real options theory in explaining firms‘ abandonment decisions. I develop a set of
hypotheses in the context of firms‘ R&D investment strategies in the world chemical industry.
Using U.S. patent renewal data, I empirically test the hypotheses. The results from the empirical
analyses suggest that, 1) firms‘ actual innovation abandonment decisions are consistent with the
predictions made from real options theory; and 2) a real options perspective provides better
explanation of firms‘ abandonment decisions than traditional economic theory and the behavioral
theory of the firm. Therefore, taking such a perspective allows us to better predict abandonment
than the other models. In investigating whether insights from real options theory enlighten firm‘s
abandonment decisions, this research contributes to the strategic decision making literature, real
options research, RBV and dynamic capability research and innovation literature.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Today many industries are characterized by rapid changes in technology,
ambiguous consumer demands and heightened competition. These changes are persistent
and can be competence destroying such that firms can no longer earn above average
return for a meaningful period of time based on a single innovation or advantage (Bogner
& Barr, 2000). In order to pursue competitive advantages and thus sustain superior
performance, firms have to undertake various strategic actions to keep pace with
environmental changes and exploit market opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989), to seek risk
and innovation (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988), and to create new spaces that are
uniquely suited to the firms‘ strengths (Hamel & Prahalad, 2005).
Current strategy theory and research suggest that effective firms undertake a
series of actions to gain and sustain competitive advantages, which are in turn,
continually being undermined by changes in the environment (e.g., Ferrier, Smith,
Grimm, 1999; Lee, Smith, Grimm, Schomburg, 2000; Makadok, 1998). Thus, firms
exhibiting sustained competitive advantage are, in fact, constantly searching for new or
improved basis for that competitive advantage. Theory and research also suggest that
these firm actions need to be experimental-based, because it can be unclear what
directions changes in the competitive environment will take (Weick, 1995). By taking
such experimental actions a firm can learn more about the environment and the potential
of these actions, and it can access a range of alternative opportunities to take in the future.
These actions are consistent with action-based sense making, because when they are
undertaken, managers have little knowledge ex ante about whether the actions will be

1

successful (Bogner & Barr, 2000). Such a series of experimental actions extend the firms‘
past investments and strengths into the future, and provide the firm with unique strategic
positioning as compared to competitors employing different sense making schema
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).
The risky and explorative nature of experimental-based actions implies that a
portfolio of these actions will be necessary over time. Because environmental changes
can create new growth opportunities or erode the profitability potential of previously
attractive investments, adjustments in this portfolio need to constantly be made. Thus,
firms must act as adaptive learners, making timely adaptations and adjusting their
capability sets to exploit current and future market opportunities. Further, firms are
constrained by limited resources, and managers are unable to manage an unlimited
number of investments or businesses. In practice, therefore, most firms are pursuing
many more projects and ideas than they can successfully execute (MacMillan and
McGrath, 2002). Thus, firms have to regularly re-examine and re-arrange their
investment portfolios. And it follows that how effectively firms conduct this reexamination and re-arrangement of their portfolios will be a significant component on
their ability to sustain competitive advantage in a dynamic environment.
Timely abandonment of previously attractive investments is an important way to
revise a firm‘s investment portfolio. In general, as Chang (1996) suggested, exit is a
necessary component of a firm‘s search and learning process. It is a phenomenon that is
common in dynamic competitive environment where exploration and innovation are
critical, and effective entrepreneurship is highly valued. Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004)
noted that it is not uncommon that firms abandon some markets and later enter related
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markets to deploy their resources and capabilities. As all firm investments entail
organizational resources and managerial attention, managing abandonment has important
implications for firms. Firms need to terminate less attractive projects in a timely manner
to limit the downside risk. In addition, timely abandonment is critical for firms to redirect
valuable resources to those projects that can lead to greater return. Unsuccessful
investments can comprise a significant proportion of all the investments that firms make.
If firms are unable to effectively abandon less promising projects, they will be unable to
focus their resources on the more promising investments. Thus, abandonment is not
necessarily a rare and desperate management decision as it was regarded in the past.
Rather, it can be a regular proactive choice linking resource allocation to superior
performance.
Strategy research has noted the importance of abandonment. Dating back to the
seminal work by Cyert and March (1963) and Nelson and Winter (1982), the behavioral
theory of the firm and evolutionary economics suggest that firms follow particular
routines and search processes to identify strategic assets and make investments to
upgrade their strategic assets. By doing so, firms seek to improve their competitive
positions. During this evolutionary process, when firms find that some strategic
investments are less promising than expected, they should terminate such investments. In
his widely cited article, Porter (1996) pointed out that the essence of firm strategy is
choosing what not to do. The resource-based view of the firm (RBV), and especially the
dynamic capability research, suggests that firms consistently seek, acquire, and exploit
their resources to attain competitive advantages and pursue superior performance (Barney
1991; Teece, Pisano, Shuen 1997). While firms strive to develop and accumulate
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valuable resources, it is also important for them to decide what not to do, including
discontinuing some investments in which they have previously invested resources. For
example, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) noted that the key to firm effectiveness in
dynamic markets is a firm‘s ability not only to decide which processes to incorporate into
ongoing routines but also to decide which processes to leave out. Siggelkow (2002) also
argued that when firms are confronted with evolving market conditions, asset trimming is
one of the core processes that firms engage in to create and elaborate core organizational
capabilities.
Although the literature has recognized the importance of abandonment,
abandonment decision remains largely an unexplored area in the strategy literature. Staw
(1993) noted that much of organizational theory can be reduced to two fundamental
questions: how to get organizations moving, and how to get organizations stopped once
they are moving. He suggested that while the vast majority of organizational studies
focus on why and how organizations initiate action, more attention should be devoted to
understanding of organizational termination decisions. Along these lines, Mahoney and
Pandian (1992) pointed out that while the resource-based view predicts growth and
diversification, a ―resource-based theory of divestment is clearly lacking‖. Indeed, little
empirical research has been conducted in this territory. The studies that did examine
divestment mostly studied abandonment decisions in the context of divesture of entire
business units or product segments such as corporate divestment decisions, which are
often linked to previous diversification (e.g., Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Chang, 1996).
Hence, as suggested by Lowe and Veloso (2004), more research at the more granular
level is needed to examine firms‘ abandonment decisions. In this research I move from
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the more common corporate-level strategic perspective and look primarily at the
investment decisions that are components of business-level strategy.
While at the firm level we can say that abandonment decisions are important for
firm performance and firms should make effective abandonment decisions, at the
individual investment level abandonment decisions are not always wisely made. Despite
the normative literature that suggests firms should make timely decisions to abandon
certain investments and pursue those that entail higher growth potential, research shows
that abandoning ongoing investments poses substantial challenges to firms. Guler (2007b)
argued that while the signals of progress are relatively easy to interpret when the projects
perform well, signals of failure are ambiguous and complex. Therefore, she suggested
that firms usually can effectively decide to continue successful investments, but it is
much more challenging for firms to identify and abandon investments that are no longer
economically justified.
In addition, any decision that involves reversing a prior, public commitment
involves cognitive biases that are not found in decisions to invest. Thus abandonment
decisions take mechanics of distinctive traits when compared to investment decisions.
I propose in this dissertation that a real options perspective can provide an
effective means of re-examining and revising firms‘ strategic investment decisions in
general, and of making individual, investment-level abandonment decisions in particular.
I argue that in these situations real options theory can provide a better lens for the
examination of investment value than traditional economic models such as Net Present
Value (NPV) and the behavioral theory of the firm alone. Although there are difficulties
for firms in reversing what has been done, using the real option lens can help firms
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overcome or reduce cognitive and behavioral biases and thus help them make
abandonment decisions more effectively. In the remainder of this dissertation, I will
examine firms‘ investment abandonment decisions using arguments based on economic
logic, the behavioral theory of the firm and real options theory.
The main research questions to be explored in this dissertation are:
1. To what extent do firms make decisions to abandon or keep investments
in accordance with the predictions and prescriptions made from real options
theory?
2. What is the relative strength of the Net Present Value model, the
behavioral theory of the firm, and real options theory in explaining firms’
abandonment decisions?

Although real options theory is conceptually rooted in finance, I approach these
questions from a strategic management perspective. I borrow from the resource-based
view (RBV), knowledge-based view (KBV) and search literature to help build my
arguments. According to RBV and KBV, firms differ in their resources including
knowledge and capabilities, and these resource differences can explain performance
differentials across firms. As a firm‘s strategic investments can be considered as options
on growth opportunities, the knowledge utilized in such investments has implications for
the value of such options. In addition, the firm‘s knowledge asset position has influence
on the value the firm can appropriate from the strategic investments. Therefore,
knowledge heterogeneity may also lead to differences across firms in the valuation of
similar investments.
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Real options theory in recent years has attracted increasing academic interest in
the field of strategic management. Bowman and Hurry (1993) suggested that real options
theory is an attractive framework to examine strategic decision making under uncertainty.
Fruitful research using the real option lens has been conducted with respect to many types
of strategic decisions, among which are joint ventures (Kogut, 1991; Kumar, 2005; Reuer
& Tong, 2005), international entry (Reuer and Leiblein, 2000), equity partnerships (Folta
and Miller, 2002), industry entry (Kim and Kogut, 1996; Folta and O‘Brien, 2004), and
R&D investments (McGrath, 1997; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Some scholars also use
other terms to refer to the application of real options theory in management studies, such
as ROA (real option approach or real option analysis) (Kumar and Shyam, 2005;
Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001), ROR (real option reasoning) (McGrath and Nerkar,
2004), and ROL (real option logic) (Warner, Fairbank, and Steensma, 2006). Though the
terms differ, they all refer to the same underlying conceptualization of strategic decision
making being seen through a real option lens.
Most extant research applying real options theory in the field of strategic
management has examined the adoption of new options, leaving the implementing of
options under-studied. Even less research has been conducted on firms‘ abandonment
decisions. Some scholars raise criticisms of this gap in the research and argue that
abandonment is a critical aspect of real options perspective (Adner and Levinthal, 2004).
They suggested that by not examining the abandonment decisions, the real option
research does not offer a complete test of the theory and lacks persuading support in this
vein. Importantly, because real options theory is being applied to managerial decision
processes, its application to abandonment decisions is not merely applying the same
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procedure as an initial investment, and deciding not to invest, as might be suggested by a
financial options perspective. This dissertation responds to the call and seeks to examine
whether real options theory can help us understand firms‘ investment abandonment
decisions.
In this study I do not intend to explicitly calculate the value of specific options.
Rather, I examine whether factors that impact option value are systematically related to
the actual abandonment decisions in a manner consistent with predictions derived from
real options theory. In doing so, I develop and empirically test a series of hypotheses in
the context of R&D strategies, which represent a critical aspect of firms‘ strategic
investment decisions.
In investigating whether insights from real options theory enlighten firm‘s
abandonment decisions, this study seeks to make the following contributions to the
literature.
First, it contributes broadly to the strategic decision making literature. The
incorporation of a real options theory perspective into the strategic decision making
literature in general, and abandonment decisions in particular, offers two important
contributions. First, it allows for the development of a more complete model of decision
making than that offered by either economic models or behavioral theory alone.
Economic models, such as NPV, have served as good normative models for decision
making, but, as will be noted in subsequent chapters, they do not accurately reflect actual
decision making behavior. The behavioral theory of the firm recognizes the biased and
cognitively constrained nature of decision making in practice and so comes closer to
predicting actual decision outcomes. However, managers often make complex decisions
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under conditions of uncertainty that have quite positive results, despite the biases and
heuristics that behavioral theory claims should limit the effectiveness of decision making.
This suggests that current models of decision making may be incomplete and that
managers may use logics that help overcome cognitive limitations. I will argue that real
options reasoning can provide that logic. If the findings from this study provide evidence
that real options reasoning is used in abandonment decisions, along with economic and
behavioral logics, then we will have moved one step closer to building a more
comprehensive model of strategic decision making.
The second contribution to the strategic decision making literature concerns
avenues for future research. If the results suggest that there is a significant relationship
between the variables that determine option value and abandonment decisions, it raises
the question of whether real options logic truly improves decision making. Thus, my
findings would open up an important new avenue of research that would seek to
determine the relationship between real options reasoning and decision outcomes. If such
a link is found, it would move the role of real options logics in decision making from
purely descriptive to a more prescriptive role.
This study also seeks to advance the development of real option research by
empirically testing the application of real options theory in the implementation of firms‘
investment options. Although real options theory has attracted significant interest in the
field of strategic management and considerable progress has been made, many scholars
agree that empirical studies that validate the propositions of real options theory are still
sparse. The implementing of real option abandonment decisions remains underresearched, although it is a critical aspect of real options in general.
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Third, it contributes to innovation literature as I develop and test the hypotheses
that emerge from real options theory in the setting of R&D investment decisions. In spite
of widespread attention to firm innovations in the form of patents, little is known about
how firms manage their innovation portfolio through the abandonment of patents and the
research trajectory that they represent. The use of real options theory provides new
insights into the valuation of firms‘ R&D investments and patent abandonment decisions.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter I
present the theory background and develop a set of propositions about investment
valuation and thus abandonment. Chapter Three develops a series of hypotheses on firms‘
R&D investment abandonment decisions. Then Chapter Four presents the research
methods, explaining my use of logistic analysis to empirically test the hypotheses in the
context of the world chemical industry using U.S. patent data. Chapter Five reports the
hypotheses test results. In Chapter Six I present the discussion, implications, limitations
and future research.

CHAPTER TWO
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter, I will compare the arguments about investment valuation derived
from traditional economic logic, behavioral theory of the firm, and real options theory.
Then a series of propositions will be developed.

II. 1. Economic logic

10

Traditional economic theory assumes that managers are fully rational and make
optimal decisions. The most popular traditional approach to valuating investments is the
net present value (NPV) calculation, which is based on discounted cash flow (DCF). The
reasoning is that an investment creates value for shareholders if the present value of the
expected cash inflow exceeds that of the expected cash outflow. Namely, an investment
should be made when the net present value is positive. NPV models assume that
investment decisions are based on managers‘ rational valuation of the investments. The
NPV valuation technique offers an economic rationale for investments and is widely
applied.
However, this neoclassical investment model has both conceptual and
implementation problems (Slater, Reddy, Zwirlein, 1998). Conceptually, the NPV
approach gives limited consideration to uncertainty and does not adequately consider the
value of embedded growth opportunities, thus it tends to devalue those investments that
do not produce clear, measurable cash flow streams. In addition, the NPV approach takes
a static view and fails to consider management‘s ability to revise their decisions in
response to subsequent unanticipated market developments, which can cause cash flows
to deviate from original expectations (Ross, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1993). As a result, the
NPV approach tends to under-value explorative projects and long-term strategic
investments (Haley and Goldberg, 1995; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Stein, 1996).
In addition to these conceptual problems, implementation problems with the NPV
approach include inaccuracy and bias in forecasts of cash flow, and the use of an
inappropriate discount rate. As managers are only boundedly rational and have limited
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information processing ability (March and Simon, 1958), the calculation of net present
value will often be meaningfully inaccurate because of the inappropriate inputs.
In light of the above, it is not surprising that many observed managerial behaviors
are inconsistent with the expectations that come from a pure NPV model (Dixit, 1992).
Firms that solely rely on NPV models may abandon investments that entail valuable
opportunities. As a result, NPV models do not provide satisfactory prescriptive or
descriptive models for explaining firms‘ abandonment decisions. Bettis and Hitt (1995)
pointed out that when the environment is competitive and changing, reliance on such an
approach is like a corporate ritual rather than an appropriate decision technique. In
particular, NPV models tend to undervalue longer-term strategic investments and ignore
the embedded growth opportunities. This is because strategic investments are usually
characterized by exploration to a certain extent and are frequently confronted with
significant uncertainties. Thus, firms using NPV models to evaluate strategic investments
are inclined not to invest in projects that are of negative NPV but can be promising in the
future. Even firms that have been successful in the past may fail to adapt or adopt new
technology that will meet customers‘ unstated or future needs and will eventually fall
behind (Christensen, 1997). Therefore, firms tend to prematurely terminate investments
that might otherwise be profitable. This is analogous to type II error in research (Guler,
2007b).
Proposition 1:
Traditional NPV models can undervalue strategic investments and lead firms to
abandon such investments too early.
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II. 2. Behavioral theory of the firm
The behavioral theory of the firm emphasizes the actual process of decision
making. Behavioral theory of the firm scholars criticize the neoclassical economic theory
for assuming profit maximization and internal efficiency, and ignoring the most
significant features of the organizational process, i.e., the process of actually managing
the factors of production (Simon, 1982). The analytic assumptions of perfect rationality
are not just incomplete, but are misleading as they are contrary to the actual processes
that firm managers use to make decisions in complex business situations.
The behavioral theory of the firm is consistent with economics logic in the sense
that the behaviors of organizations are considered as actions performed by coordinated
agents to achieve their goals, but it insists on coming to terms with cognitive limits
(Mahoney, 2006). In contrast to neoclassical models such as NPV that assume decision
maker rationality and optimal decision making, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests
that managers are only boundedly rational with limitations in information processing and
that they make satisficing decisions (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). As pointed out by Bromiley (2005), while the traditional
capital investment literature frames the investment problem as selecting among welldefined projects, real projects are rarely clearly defined and there are no cash flow
forecasts attached. Therefore actual managerial evaluations of investments are not strictly
made from the economics models. Greve (2003) showed that firms‘ R&D expenses and
innovation launches are influenced by firm performance and slack resources, consistent
with predictions derived from the behavioral theory of the firm. Sometimes firms can
even do the opposite of what the economics literature suggests (Bromiley, 2005).
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The bounded rationality and limited information processing capacity assumptions
are more realistic and can better describe organizational behaviors compared to the
neoclassical theory in which decision makers are regarded as fully rational. However,
managers‘ decision biases impact their investment evaluations and can lead to decisions
that are irrational in an economic sense. It can be hard for firms to identify investments
that are no longer justified and decide to terminate such investments, although the ability
to do so is critical for a firm to pursue investments with significant growth potential.
Scholars have come to the observation that the challenges associated with abandoning
investments can be even greater than those associated with initiating investments (Garud
and Van de Ven, 1992; Adner and Levinthal, 2004).
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that organizational factors lead firms to
develop inertia and thus firms tend to continue doing what they have been doing (March
and Simon, 1958). Because of internal organizational factors, firms are inclined to keep
those investments that have been initiated by making follow-on investments. A prominent
manifestation of organizational inertia is the observation that ―exploitation drives out
exploration‖ (March, 1991). This will lead to learning traps that favor specialization and
inhibit experimentation (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993), competency traps
that impede an organization from accumulating adequate experience with a newer and
eventually superior procedure (Levitt and March, 1988), and obsolescence in knowledge
development (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000). As the result, the firm‘s competitiveness in the
long run is harmed.
All the above dysfunctional outcomes can result from decision biases. In the
following sub-sections I develop in further detail two types of biases that influence firms‘
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valuation of strategic investments and, in particular, can bias decisions to abandon
investments: escalation of commitment and uncertainty avoidance.

II. 2. 1. Escalation of commitment
Escalation of commitment is a decision bias that has attracted sustained attention
in organizational theory. Strategic investments are typically courses of actions associated
with a series of decisions rather than isolated decisions. There are times when a decision
maker has invested in a project or course of action and the project goes poorly. The
literature shows that there are many instances in which decision makers in these
circumstances become locked into a losing course of action. They may commit more
efforts and resources even when the additional investment is not expected to pay off, or
persist in the course of action despite the signal of failure. Such a situation is referred to
as escalation of commitment. There may be a tendency for decision makers to become
locked into losing situations so that they are ―throwing good money after bad‖ (Staw,
1981).
Both individual and organizational decision makers exhibit undesirable decision
commitment and face difficulties in terminating investments or courses of action. Early
research on escalation of commitment research mostly concerned individuals and most of
the evidence was collected through laboratory studies (e.g., Brockner, Rubin, and Lang,
1981; Corlon and Garland, 1993). Organizational scholars, however, have also found
evidence of commitment escalation in organizational decision making (e.g., Staw, 1976;
Staw and Hoang, 1995; McNamara, Moon, and Bromiley, 2002). For example, Garud
and Van de Ven (1992) suggest that managers focused on a particular project may see
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greater potential in the pursuit of the project and become dedicated to the initiative. In a
series of research studies, Staw and his colleagues found that decision makers may
become over committed to a course of action as they seek to recoup their losses and
justify their previous decisions (Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978)
or to conform to the norms of consistency (Staw and Ross, 1980). McGrath (1999) also
suggested that managers can become over committed because they are unwilling to admit
error or failure.
Therefore, although traditional economic theory suggests that investments should
be continued if future benefits are greater than future costs and otherwise be abandoned,
escalation of commitment leads decision makers to keep an investment open even though
it is ―throwing good money after bad‖. By doing so, firms are likely to commit type I
errors (Guler, 2007b), as they may fail to terminate investments that are no longer
economically justified.
Proposition 2:
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that escalation of commitment often
leads firms to fail to abandon investments in a timely manner.

II. 2. 2. Uncertainty avoidance
The behavioral theory of the firm literature suggests that both individual and
organizational decisions may be biased toward uncertainty avoidance, in the sense that
the decision makers tend to choose alternatives with foreseeable outcomes. Ellsberg‘s
experiments (1961) showed that people generally avoid ambiguous choices. Curley,
Yates, and Abrams (1986) found that if decision makers anticipate that others will
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evaluate their decisions, the decision makers tend to choose clear alternatives and avoid
ambiguous alternatives because they believe that such alternatives are less justifiable than
clear ones. At the organization level, Cyert and March (1963) argued that organizations
typically exhibit uncertainty avoidance in the actual process of organizational decision
making: organizational goal, expectation, choice and control. They suggested that
uncertainty avoidance is a basic principle of firms‘ general choice procedures.
Organizations try to avoid the need to anticipate events in the distant future. They tend to
use decision rules emphasizing short-run actions and short-run effects, rather than
anticipating long-run uncertain events.
Strategic investments have effects on performance in the long run and are often
characterized by significant uncertainty. As a matter of fact, strategy is largely about
resource allocation when the resulting impact on performance is not clear. The
uncertainty avoidance bias, therefore, tends to make firms reluctant to allocate resources
to longer-term strategic investments. Consequently, firms inadequately initiate long-term
and explorative strategic investments, and tend to be biased toward projects with lower
uncertainty when valuating ongoing investments. Thus the decision makers are more
inclined to continue those investments with clear and certain payoffs. As a result, they
may commit type II error, terminating explorative investments that are of higher
uncertainty, even though they may be rewarding in the future. This leads to the following
proposition and it is going to be contrasted with real options perspective later.
Proposition 3a:
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that firms are overly inclined to
abandon investments with higher uncertainty.
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Bounded rationality as well as cognitive and behavioral biases constrain and
shape organizational decisions (e.g., March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963).
These behavioral and cognitive biases may lead to decisions that are irrational in an
economic sense. The decision errors in investment termination can be either type I error
(failing to abandon investments which are no longer economically justified and should be
terminated in a timely manner), or type II error (abandoning investments which are of
high potential and should be kept). From a normative perspective, however, organizations
should avoid such biases and decision errors. Organizational decision makers are experts
in their fields and thus should use their expertise and experience to strive to avoid such
decision errors. Also, as the survival of firms depends on effective business decisions,
those firms that repeatedly exhibit decision errors should be selected out of the
environment in the long run (Knez, Smith, and William, 1985; Smith, 1989). Thus, firms
need to look for ways to avoid strategic decision errors and improve the efficacy of their
decision making.
Although the behavioral theory of the firm explains some variance between
observed managerial decisions and economically rational ones, it is descriptive and does
not offer decision making approaches for overcoming these biases through the institution
of alternative decision processes or routines. Therefore, by itself the behavioral theory of
the firm has limited prescriptive insight and cannot be relied on to prescribe what
decisions managers should make or how they should make them. Further, while
subsequent research that takes a behavioral theory prescriptive has offered some methods
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to improve decision making, they have focused primarily on the decisions to invest and
have not addressed investment termination.
These observations lead naturally to the question: How can managers ensure
sound decision making and improve their effectiveness in making decisions, while also
reducing such biases and errors? In the following, I propose that real options theory can
be used to improve managerial decision making prescriptions by overcoming the
weaknesses of both the NPV perspective and the behavioral theory of the firm, and, in
turn, may be a better predictor of organizational decisions.

II. 3. Real options theory
Recent research suggests that a real option lens might usefully complement the
traditional approaches to evaluate firms‘ strategic investment decisions (Mitchell and
Hamilton, 1988; Kogut, 1991; Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Trigeorgis, 1996; McGrath,
1997; Slater, Reddy, Zwirlein, 1998). Originating in the finance literature, real options
theory presumes information asymmetries, path dependence and uncertainty (Miller,
1998). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) in their book, Investment under Uncertainty, offer an
excellent survey of how real options theory advances the understanding of evaluation of
explorative and risky projects relative to the traditional approaches. Unlike an NPV
model that sets investment thresholds (i.e., at NPVs=0) ahead of the investment, real
options theory accommodates the process of retrospective sense making and the
management‘s ability to revise their investment decisions. In contrast to the static view of
NPV, real options theory takes a more flexible and dynamic view because it values the
ability to preserve management decision options in the future. Further, it provides a set of
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decision rules that managers can utilize to avoid biases. Therefore, real options theory
may reveal valuable insights that traditional approaches fail to provide for managerial
decision making.
In the following, I will give a brief introduction to financial option theory and the
use of option theory in strategy research, and then apply real options theory to investment
valuation.

II. 3. 1. Financial option theory
Originating in finance, an option originally referred to special contractual
arrangement that conveys the right, but not the obligation to purchase (call option) or sell
(put option) an underlying asset at a preset price (exercise price, or striking price) in the
future. As uncertainty exists about the price of the underlying asset, there is the
possibility that the asset price may exceed the preset price so the call option is of positive
value. Similarly, a put option is valuable as the price of the underlying asset may possibly
fall below the preset price. There is phenomenal growth in option trading on organized
exchanges since April 1973, when the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE)
became the first organized exchange for trading standardized option contracts. The option
traded volume in 2006 at this Exchange surpassed 674.7 million contracts (CBOE
website).
Option theory has become a significant component in the field of finance. It plays
a major role in shaping the thinking in finance today because of its ability to assume the
existence of considerable uncertainty and value flexibility. While the most common
options traded on exchanges are options on stocks or bonds, many other financial
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instruments have some option features. Indeed, much of corporate financial theory can be
presented in option terms. In this view, common stock can be viewed as a call option on
the underlying assets of a leveraged firm; risky debt, convertible debt, insurance,
warrants, almost every issue of bonds and stocks may be thought of as options. Even the
capital structure of the firm, capital budgeting, investment policy, mergers and
acquisitions, spin-offs and dividend policy, can all be viewed in terms of options (Cox,
Ross, Rubinstein, 1979; Copeland and Weston, 1992).
Option pricing theory, therefore, is relevant to almost every area of finance (Cox,
Ross, Rubinstein, 1979). Applications of option pricing theory in finance include but are
not limited to dividend policy, spin-offs, divestitures, convertible debt and warrants, exit
decisions, capital asset pricing, and arbitrage pricing (Copeland and Weston, 1992).
While organized option markets have developed fast in the past few decades, option
pricing theory also has undergone rapid advances in recent years. The most widely used
and well-accepted option-pricing models are the Black-Sholes model (Black-Sholes,
1973) and the binomial model. The Black-Sholes formula is considered one of the most
important contributions in finance. It presents the price (thus the value) of an option as a
function of five factors: the price of the underlying asset, the variance of the underlying
asset, the time to expiration date, the exercise price, and the risk-free rate of return. Table
1 gives a simple description of the predicted relationships.
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Table 1
Relationships predicted by Black-Sholes Model
Impact on option price
the price of the underlying asset
+
the variance of the underlying asset
+
the time to expiration date
+
the exercise price
the risk-free rate of return
+

The binomial option pricing approach uses binomial distributions and was
independently derived by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) and Rendleman and Bartter
(1979). It usually involves numerical calculations that can be facilitated with computer
simulation. The binomial option pricing approach predicts relationships between the
impacting factors and the option price that are similar to the Black-Sholes model. As a
matter of fact, the Black-Sholes model can be regarded as a limiting case of the binomial
option pricing approach (Copeland and Weston, 1992).

II. 3. 2. From financial option to real option
Although options have an origin in finance, option features are not limited to
financial instruments. Almost all assets are really certain types of contingent claims
because most investment decisions entail ongoing uncertainty, incomplete available
information, and the possibility of exercising future managerial discretion (Dixit, 1992).
Thus, option features are pervasive in many managerial decisions. Almost all projects
have option-like characteristics and can be thought of as options—they are referred to as
―real‖ options, because they are options on operating assets as opposed to financial assets
that are tradable on market. Flexibility and embedded growth opportunities are inherent
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in many investment proposals, making options an important aspect of the decision.
Option valuation is therefore relevant to many strategic decisions of firms. Ross (1995)
actually suggests that all investment decisions should be treated as option valuation
problems. By incorporating the value of such real options, decision makers of firms can
facilitate many of their decisions such as business entry, strategic alliances, and R&D
investments etc.
There are important differences between financial options and real options so
financial option-pricing models cannot be directly applied to real options problems. For
example, finance theories are based on assumptions of market efficiency and equilibrium,
hence market prices are evaluated to exactly reflect the value of the asset, and these
prices are readily observable on market. Thus, using the option-pricing model, the value
of options on stocks and bonds can be calculated explicitly. However, real options cannot
be easily evaluated in such concrete numbers, and the use of this financial option pricing
methodology for real options is limited by various difficulties.
First, real options lack some of the explicit features of exchange-traded options,
so the financial models can be problematic. One important concern is that financial
options and real options differ in their assumptions about the distribution of the future
prices (return) of the underlying asset (Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001). Option pricing
models are based on different assumptions about the distribution of the underlying asset
price. The Black-Sholes model, for example, assumes that the stock price follows a
lognormal distribution with a constant level of volatility. Such assumptions about
distribution, however, may be inappropriate for real options as the distribution of return
can be quite lopsided.
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Second, firm specific resources and capabilities are commonly involved in real
managerial decisions. These factors are not incorporated in the standard financial option
valuation models. However, firm specific resources and capabilities can significantly
impact the value the firm can realize through its strategic investments. For example,
whether a firm has independently held complementary resources to expand in a target
market affects the firm‘s valuation of a joint venture and accordingly the decision to
acquire or divest (Kogut, 1991; Chi, 2000)
Third, like other quantitative models, there are a number of implementation
problems related with quantitatively using the standard financial option pricing models to
evaluate strategic real options (Lander and Pinches, 1998). Determining the value of
inputs is challenging. The underlying asset of a real option is usually not publicly traded
on active market; the asset price is thus not readily observable like a stock or bond price.
Similarly, the future cash flow and the volatility of future return are difficult to predict;
the risk-free rate of return may vary over the option‘s lifetime; the exercise prices for real
options may not be known ahead of time. As a result, if the inputs are not calculated right,
the valuation outcome derived from the option-pricing model is misleading.
In addition, the standard financial option pricing models cannot be directly
applied to a strategic real option without complicated customization of modeling. The
mathematical solution of the customized pricing algorithm can be overly sophisticated for
most corporate managers and thus limit its use in many firms. Furthermore, real projects
often are collections of embedded options, making the explicit pricing almost impossible.
Consequently, real managers rarely explicitly employ advanced real option pricing
models in strategic decision making (Copeland and Keenan, 1998). Rather, firms most
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likely use the real options perspective qualitatively to facilitate their strategic decision
making. Along with other scholars in strategy, I am not proposing that the real options
perspective be used as a substitute for traditional valuation methods. Rather, I argue that
the real options perspective can be a useful complement to the traditional approaches.
This is consistent with Bowman and Moskowitz‘s observation that using multiple forms
of analysis can be advantageous and lead to sound decision as the different methods can
act as a check on each other (Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001).

II. 3. 3. Application of real options theory in strategy research
Recent literature in strategic management provides support for the argument that
many aspects of firm behaviors are consistent with real options theory. Kogut, one of the
early advocates of using real option lens in strategy research, suggested that joint
ventures are created as real options to expand into new product markets in response to
future technological and market developments (Kogut, 1991). He argued that joint
ventures are an attractive mechanism for investing in an option to expand in risky
markets as joint ventures can share risks and decrease the total investment. The firm can
exercise the option by acquiring the joint venture when the market for the technology or
new product is proven. Thus he hypothesized that the timing of the acquisition should be
triggered by a product market signal indicating an increase in the venture‘s valuation.
Consistent with real options theory, he found that unexpected growth in the product
market for the joint venture increases the likelihood of acquisition, but unexpected
shortfalls in product shipments do not have significant effect on the likelihood of
dissolution. Kumar (2005) also suggested that a joint venture confers the option to buy
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(i.e., to acquire) and the option to sell (i.e., to divest) the venture. By keeping the joint
venture, the firm maintains flexibility and keeps such flexibility options open. When the
firm exercises the option to buy or sell, a joint venture is terminated through acquisition
or divestment. He examined the impact of the acquiring or divesting of joint ventures on
the value creation of a parent firm. Consistent with real options theory, Kumar found that
ventures that are divested to refocus a parent firm‘s product market portfolio are
associated with significant value creation, and that firms gain lesser value when they
terminate ventures in uncertain and concentrated industries.
Using a real options perspective, Folta and Miller (2002) examined equity
purchases of partner firms subsequent to initial minority equity investment. They argued
that uncertainty, firm valuation, and the threat of preemptive rivalry influence the choice
between flexibility and commitment. They hypothesized that the resolution of uncertainty
for technologies motivates commitment decisions, and that when the underlying growth
opportunity is at risk of preemption by rivals, greater uncertainty encourages commitment.
Using data from minority investments in the biotechnology industry by established firms
from outside of biotechnology, they found support for their hypotheses.
McGrath and Nerkar (2004) applied real options theory to explore pharmaceutical
firms‘ motivation to invest in technological areas new to the firm. They considered a
firm‘s R&D activities in a new technological area as the adoption of a new option. They
identified three constructs—scope of opportunity of a firm‘s first patent in a new
technological area, the firm‘s prior experience in the area, and competition in the area.
They argued that these constructs influence the firm‘s propensity to continue its R&D
investment in the area. Based on an analysis of the patents of firms in the pharmaceutical
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industry, they found that firms‘ investments in new R&D areas as reflected by subsequent
patents in these areas are consistent with the arguments based on real options theory.

II. 3. 4. Investment valuation with a real option approach
Myers (1977) was the earliest to view a firm‘s discretionary future investment
opportunities as growth options, or call options on real assets, arguing that the firm has
the discretion to decide in the future whether it will exercise such options. He suggested
that the value of a firm and any other investments can be broken into the cash flows
stemming from assets in their current use and those stemming from their redeployment or
future expansion. The latter cash flows are only realized if the assets are redeployed or
future investment opportunities are actually exploited. Therefore, they entail the value of
growth opportunities---- the value of growth options, or the option to grow (Kogut, 1991;
Myers, 1977). In other words, the value of an investment (V) can be decomposed in terms
of assets that are currently in place (VAIP) and the embedded growth options (VO):
(1)

V=VAIP+VO

VAIP can be measured by the discounted current earnings on the assets in place.
The growth option, VO, emphasizes the value of embedded opportunities to gain return in
the future (e.g., Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; Tong, Reuer and Peng, 2005). Researchers
have found that many investments create future growth opportunities and can
significantly contribute to growth option value. Investments in joint ventures, advertising,
research and technology platforms can create highly valuable growth options (e.g., Myers
1977, 1984; Kogut, 1991; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). Early investments can enable a
firm to acquire a greater ability to expand in the future and to take better advantage of
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future growth opportunities. For example, early R&D investments can lead to a new
generation product or process; acquisitions can enable a firm to access new markets or
strengthen desirable core capabilities.
These early investments may lead to future competitive advantages, including but
not limited to, technological advantage, brand name recognition by consumers and lower
future production cost (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). These potential opportunities
enhance the value of the investments beyond the current earnings. Studies found that in
many firms the value of their growth options represents a considerable proportion of the firm
value (e.g., Strebel, 1983; Kester, 1984). For example, Kester (1984) found that many

firms‘ growth option value can be over 50 percent of market value and some can be as
high as 90 percent. However, traditional valuation approaches such as NPV fail to
recognize this value, because the growth opportunities are embedded in the investments
and there is no clear cash flow. In the following, I will examine what factors impact the
valuation of the investment (V).
According to the Black-Sholes model, the value of a stock call option is a
function of five variables: the current stock price, the volatility of the stock price, the
time to expiration date, the exercise price, and the risk-free rate of return. These variables
are analogous to the features of real strategic investments. The current stock price for the
call option is analogous to the value of asset in place in the real investment. The volatility
of the stock is analogous to the variance of the return the firm will receive from the
investment. The exercise price of a call option is analogous to the future expenditure
needed by the firm to capitalize on the growth opportunities. The risk-free rate of return
is analogous to the cost of capital of the firm. I argue that real options reasoning would
suggest that by examining these features of the investment, firms can assess the
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embedded growth option value and thus alleviate the behavior biases described in the
previous section.
Past strategy research on uncertainty‘s influence on decision making usually
considered uncertainty as a disincentive for investments, as managers and investors strive
to avoid volatility in performance. Even studies taking a real options perspective mostly
emphasize the value of waiting over immediate investment when there is substantial
uncertainty. Scholars have interpreted the empirical finding that uncertainty is negatively
related with firm investment levels as powerful support of real options theory (Carruth,
Dickerson and Henley, 2000; Guiso and Parigi, 1999). Option theory, however, also
suggests that the variance of asset price increases the value of the option written on the
asset. This can be illustrated by the valuation of stock call options: the higher the
volatility of stock price, the more likely the stock price may exceed the exercise price in
the future. As option holders keep the upside potential but limit the downside risk, they
receive the payoffs from the positive tail of the probability distribution. Therefore,
although a rise in the volatility of an asset decreases its market value, it will increase the
value of the option written on the asset (Copeland and Weston, 1992). This feature of
options has important implications for managerial decisions about investments. Recent
research actually has begun to indicate that higher uncertainty can mean greater
opportunity for future growth rather than simply larger risk, and thus encourages
investments (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998).
When valuating new investment initiation such as industry entry, a firm needs to
consider two types of real options embedded in the investment decision: the option to
defer and the option to grow (Folta and O‘Brien, 2004). The former option addresses the
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value of waiting and the latter address the growth potential. The relative value of the two
options determines whether the investment is taken or not. Folta and O‘Brien suggested
that while the two types of options have opposing impacts on the investment decision,
both options increase in value with increasing uncertainty. As a result, the net impact on
the investment decision can be ambiguous. In most cases, before the investment is
undertaken, uncertainty increases the value of the option to defer more than the value of
the option to grow (Folta and O‘Brien, 2004), so uncertainty often leads firms to wait.
For an existing investment, however, the option to defer entry is killed and the firm
obtains an option to grow once the investment is made. Therefore uncertainty of the
return will increase the value of the option to grow and thus lead the firm to keep the
investment. Recalling equation (1), I expect a positive relationship between uncertainty
and the value of the investment:
Proposition 3b:
Real options perspective suggests that firms are less inclined to abandon
investments with higher uncertainty, ceteris paribus.

This proposition contrasts with the behavioral theory of the firm and Proposition
3a above. The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that managers and firms typically
exhibit uncertainty avoidance, which describes what is really happening in managerial
decision making process. Thus, Proposition 3a is a descriptive argument about managers‘
actual behaviors.
Proposition 3b, however, suggests that, all else being equal, the higher the
uncertainty of the return on an investment, the less likely it will be abandoned. This is
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because real options theory indicates that such an investment can be highly valuable.
Thus, this proposition is a prescriptive argument telling what the right decision is in a
given situation. It predicts the impact of uncertainty on investment valuation in the
opposite direction as in Proposition 3a, which comes from the behavioral bias of
uncertainty avoidance. Therefore, I suggest that using real options theory can help to
overcome or alleviate the uncertainty avoidance bias, and thus reduce the likelihood of
committing type II error.
While traditional economic theory only considers assets that are currently in place,
real options theory also counts the value of embedded growth opportunities. This portion
of investment value is not captured by traditional economic theory. Therefore taking a
real options perspective helps firms to reduce the possibility of under-valuation of
investments and thus reduce the type II errors that occur from traditional economic
models such as NPV.
Proposition 4:
Taking a real options perspective in investment valuation can help firms alleviate
the problem of too early abandonment found in traditional NPV models.

Due to escalation of commitment, it is difficult for firms to terminate their
investment projects once started. Based on the behavioral theory of the firm, I propose in
Proposition 2 that escalation of commitment often prevents firms from abandoning
investments in a timely manner. Proposition 2 is a descriptive argument about what will
most likely be observed in managerial decision making. If firms take a real options
perspective and re-examine their projects accordingly, however, they will be able to
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assess whether these projects are still economically justified. Therefore, they can make
abandonment decisions when it is needed, thus reducing the possible type I error due to
commitment escalation.
Proposition 5:
Taking a real options perspective in investment evaluation can help firms
overcome the commitment escalation problems predicted by behavioral theories.

Taken together, we have traditional economic models such as NPV approaches,
and we also have behavioral theory and real options theory, all of which predict firms‘
investment abandonment decisions. The traditional economic theory is normative, which
is about making the ideal decisions. Economic models, however, assume that the decision
maker is fully informed and fully rational, able to compute with perfect accuracy such
that the ideal decisions can be made. Such assumptions do not hold true in real
managerial decision making process of firms. Therefore the economic models do not
validly apply to the actual decision making process. The behavioral theory is descriptive,
describing what is actually happening in firms‘ managerial decision making process. The
decisions actually made are not necessarily optimal or in the best interest of firms, due to
bounded rationality and behavioral biases. Real options theory is prescriptive in that it
attempts to identify what the right decision is given the actual restrictions that firms have.
Thus, I suggest, by using the real options perspective, managers can improve the efficacy
of their decision making.
I do not suggest that real options theory should drive out the traditional economic
theory or the behavioral theory. These theories are complementary rather than substitutes
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for each other. Each theory addresses different aspects of managerial decisions and can
add variance explanation. So, using behavioral theory of the firm and economic theory
together can better explain organizational behaviors than either does separately, and
combining three theories together we can achieve even better fit in models of investment
valuation.

CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Schumpeter (1942), in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy pointed
out that innovation is critical for the creation of private wealth, social welfare and
economic growth. Since then an impressive body of literature has justified the positive
impacts of innovation on firm performance in terms of productivity growth (Bean, 1995;
Geroski, 1989; Goto & Suzuki, 1989), market share (Franko, 1989), profitability
(Cannolly & Hirschey, 1984; Geroski et al., 1993; Roberts, 1999), market value (Lerner,
1994), adaptability and long-term competitiveness (Geroski et al., 1993; Mobey, 1988).
As strategic management research focuses on understanding differentials in performance
across firms (Helfat, 2000), study of firms‘ R&D investment is a key part of strategy
research.
Though the statement that innovation is a key to superior performance in today‘s
competitive business environment is far from controversial, innovation is characterized
by extensive exploration and frequently confronted with significant uncertainties. As a
result, valuation of a firm‘s innovation investment targets is often difficult. The
traditional approach to evaluate R&D investments with the NPV calculation is not
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adequate. In this chapter, based on the propositions and arguments in the previous chapter,
I develop a series of testable hypotheses on why firms abandon investments already in
existence.
To operationalize the propositions, I examine firms‘ R&D strategies and consider
their innovations as real options. R&D investment strategy of firms is an appropriate
context to apply real options theory. As pointed out by Bowman and Moskowitz (2001),
real options theory advances our understanding and evaluation of risky and explorative
projects and encourages experimentation and proactive exploration of uncertainty, which
is a revolution in thinking. Scholars have agreed that real options theory is promising in
its potential contribution to a theory of firm innovation (McGrath, 1997; Mitchell and
Hamilton, 1988; Miller & Arikan, 2004). The presumptions of real options theory on
path-dependency and uncertainty describe realistic circumstances for managerial decision
making about R&D investment. Real options theory values flexibility, which is valuable
under uncertain conditions but is often ignored in traditional valuation approaches. Thus
models incorporating a real options perspective can more closely align with managerial
practices regarding R&D investment. By using real options theory to study organizations
we should become better at prescribing and predicting managerial decisions about
innovation that are actually made and therefore advance a theory of firms‘ R&D
investment strategies that may also generalize to other investment decisions.
A firm‘s R&D investments are investments in future opportunities. These
innovation investments confer growth options that the firm hopes will lead to a
competitive advantage. They are parallel to financial call options in many ways. Take
stock option as an example. Investors purchase a stock call option because the stock price
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may exceed the exercise price. Similarly, firms invest in R&D projects because they
believe they may be able to earn returns from the innovated technologies in the future. By
undertaking the investments, both the stock option investors and the firms acquire the
right to exercise the option but they do not have further obligations. If stock price does
exceed the exercise price by expiration date, investors can choose to exercise the stock
option by purchasing the stock at the previously specified exercise price. Similarly, firms
can exercise their growth options by leveraging the technologies in production or
licensing the technologies. If the stock price does not exceed the exercise price by the
date of expiration, stock option holders will let their stock options expire without taking
any further action; likewise, firms may abandon some of their innovations if such
innovations do not turn out to be very useful.
From a real options perspective, when firms are making decisions as whether to
keep or abandon an R&D investment, they assess the value of the investment, which
includes both the asset in place and the value of the embedded growth option. Then they
abandon those with lower valuation. By doing so, firms are able to redirect valuable
resources to more fruitful R&D activities. Unlike the evaluation of initiating new projects,
which would be the adoption of new options, the evaluation of ongoing investments for
abandonment decisions involves giving up positions resulting from previous investments.
The forces governing the two types of valuation differ in importance. While limiting the
downside risk is the governing force for the decision as to whether to defer an investment
initiation, for valuation of the investment in existence the upside potential of the
investment, i.e., the growth option value, is the primary governing force (Dixit, 1992).
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There is one critical distinction between an R&D investment as real option and a
financial option in terms of the abandonment of these options. The stock option holders
face an automatic expiration simply by taking no further actions: they just do nothing and
the stock options expire. They do not need to make further decisions as to these options.
Managers, however, do not have such an ―automatic stopping event.‖ They have to make
explicit decisions to end the R&D investment and give up current positions proactively.
For example, they have to decide that no more resources will be allocated to the
investment. This sharp contrast with financial options is at the heart of the economic and
behavioral issues associated with the abandonment of real options.
In the development of the hypotheses, I use arguments from traditional economic
theory and behavioral theory of the firm in addition to real options theory. From the
perspective of traditional economic theory, the value of assets in place, i.e., the current
earnings, is the index used to make the abandonment decision. From the behavioral
theory perspective, I identify two constructs that influence the abandonment decision:
escalation of commitment and technological uncertainty (explorativeness). From the real
options theory perspective, I identify five constructs that impact firms‘ abandonment
decisions. Two of them are also found in the other two perspectives: the value of assets
in place as represented by current earnings and technological uncertainty
(explorativeness). Three others are distinctive to real options theory: scope of innovation,
knowledge depth and knowledge complementarity. The hypothesis concerning current
earnings based on real options theory is consistent with conventional NPV models. As to
technological uncertainty (explorativeness), the behavioral theory of the firm and real
options theory suggest competing hypotheses. I favor the real option hypothesis, arguing
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that the real options perspective can help firms overcome behavioral bias, so it is
prescriptive. I argue that using the NPV model only, or using the behavioral theory of the
firm only, can lead to over-estimation or under-estimation of innovations, and that using
real options theory can overcome or reduce such biases and result in more effective
abandonment decisions.
Figure 1 gives a simple conceptual summary of the forces impacting the
innovation abandonment decision. Each of these factors will be developed in the
following pages. I am not going to calculate the option value explicitly or directly
examine the impact of the option value on the abandonment decision. Rather, I will test
the impact of the factors that influence the valuation of the innovation on the
abandonment decision. Of these factors, knowledge depth and knowledge
complementarity are at firm level and the other factors are all innovation specific.

Current earnings
Escalation of commitment
Sunk Cost
Anchoring
Technological uncertainty
(explorativeness)
Scope of application
Knowledge depth
Knowledge complementarity

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 1

37

III. 1. Innovation specific factors
III. 1. 1. Current earnings
Traditional economic theory suggests that the value of an investment can be
measured by calculating the discounted cash flow. Of the discounted cash flow
approaches, NPV models are the most popularly used. Conventional NPV models suggest
that the value of an investment is the present value of earnings from assets that are
currently in place. An investment is justified if the present value of the cash inflow is
larger than the present value of the cash outflow. Thus, the greater the discounted current
earnings from an innovation, the more likely the firm is going to keep the innovation
rather than abandon it.
From the real options perspective, the value of an innovation consists of the value
of asset in place plus the value of growth options, as shown in Equation 1. The value of
asset in place captures the NPV of current earnings from the innovation. The value of
growth options may represent a significant portion of the total innovation value.
Option theory indicates that the higher the price of the underlying asset, the more
valuable an option written on it. Thus higher current earnings of an innovation implies
that the growth opportunity embedded in the innovation is more valuable. This prediction
is consistent with NPV valuation approach. Both terms of Equation 1 have greater value
with increase in current earnings. Accordingly, an innovation with higher current
earnings is more valuable and the firm is more likely to keep it alive. Thus I come to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:
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The more current earnings an innovation has, the less likely the innovation will be
abandoned.
-

Current earnings

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 2

III. 1. 2. Escalation of commitment
Although most early studies of commitment escalation have concerned
individuals and were conducted in laboratory experiments, recent research has started to
lodge the research in organizational context. As noted above, one of the distinguishing
factors of real options versus financial options is that real options on R&D investment or
the like often require proactive behavior on the part of management. Research has found
that organizational decision makers also have difficulties in making abandonment
decisions and thus organizations may exhibit escalation of commitment. For example,
Ross and Staw (1993) examined the escalation of commitment in the Shoreham Nuclear
Power Plant, which wasted billions of dollars. Staw, Barsade, Koput (1997) and
McNamra, Moon and Bromiley (2002) examined escalation in banks‘ commercial
lending decisions. From the literature I discussed below I identify two sociocognitive
factors that can lead to commitment escalation in investments: sunk cost and anchoring.

III. 1. 2.1. Sunk cost
Sunk cost refers to resources already invested in a project. According to
traditional economic theory, a rational decision maker should only consider incremental
costs and returns when he faces a choice between continued investment in a project or
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termination of the investment. Objectively, the prior investment in the project should not
impact the decision. However, research suggests that sunk costs, the investments already
made in the project, may influence the decision to continue investment in an ongoing
project. Arkes and Blumber (1985), for example, found that subjects are more willing to
invest more funds in an ongoing project than in new project start up. In addition to the
dichotomous effect of sunk cost, Garland (1990) found that the amount of sunk cost is
positively related with the investor‘s willingness to continue investment in the project.
Research has suggested multiple theoretical explanations for the sunk cost effects: selfjustification (Staw, 1981; Teger, 1979), the desire not to waste resources already invested
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985), and information-processing heuristics of framing of decisions
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Whyte, 1986).
Because of the sunk cost effect, when managers make decisions in an
organizational context prior investment in a project may increase the firm‘s commitment
to the project. The larger the amount of sunk cost, the more biased the managers may be
toward continuing an ongoing project, even in the face of negative feedback.
The resources a firm has spent in an effort to develop and deploy an innovation
are the sunk cost of the innovation. Such investments are usually innovation specific and
irreversible. The more the firm has invested in the innovation, the more prominent the
sunk cost effect may become. The managers will have more motives to keep the
innovation alive for self-justification of the prior input. They may think that ―victory was
just around the corner‖ (McNamara and VanDeMark, 1995) and consider abandoning it
would be a waste of the already invested resources. The managers‘ framing of
abandonment as loss results in a tendency to continue committing resources to the
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innovation, even when the feedback is not positive. These lead to biased decision of
undesirable commitment:
Hypothesis 2:
The more sunk cost there is in an innovation, the less likely it will be abandoned.

Sunk cost

-

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 3

III. 1.2.2 Anchoring
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that managers respond to the
subjective environment that they perceive rather than the objective environment that they
―really‖ face (Simon, 1982). Therefore, much as managers‘ behaviors are influenced by
their subjective perception of the environment, the investment decisions of organizations
are impacted by managers‘ perception of the value of the investment. As a result, if
managers‘ perception of the value of the investment is subject to cognitive biases and
heuristics, the managers will make biased investment decisions.
Sociocognitive literature has observed that managers have difficulty in changing
beliefs. Once beliefs are developed, subsequent information processing tends to be biased
in the direction of the preexisting belief (Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984). People often
selectively filter information and interpret new information so as to maintain their beliefs
(Fiske, 1991).
A common example of belief based bias is anchoring. ―Anchoring‖ refers to the
phenomenon that different initial values yield different estimates and that the final
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estimates are biased toward the starting point, so there is ―insufficient adjustment.‖
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that judgment under uncertainty exhibits
anchoring and insufficient adjustment. People in many situations make estimates of likely
outcome by starting from an initial value and adjusting this value to yield the final answer.
The initial value, which acts as a starting point, may be given or it may be the result of
some incomplete computation made by the people who make the estimates. In any case,
people typically make insufficient adjustments based on the initial value.
Another cognitive heuristic, overconfidence, can make the anchoring effect even
larger. Psychological literature shows that many people are often overly confident about
their own relative abilities and are unreasonably optimistic about their futures (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Weinsten, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988). Such an
optimistic bias is referred as overconfidence. Camerer and Lovallo (1999), for example,
found that overconfidence leads to excessive business entry. They found that even when
people accurately forecast competition and negative industry profits, they may decide to
enter anyway because they believe their firm will succeed while most others will fail. The
authors suggested that this can be one of the explanations for the high rate of business
failure. While overconfidence may lead to excessive new business initiation, it also
makes it hard for managers to terminate their existing investment projects. Because the
decision makers may believe that, despite the unfavorable signals, they are still able to
generate considerable returns, they may become more reluctant to adjust their initial
expectation of the project.
Firms initiate innovation investments because they expect that the investments
will produce positive returns. As time passes, some projects turn out to be less promising
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than expected. Consequently, the managers ideally should revise their investment plan
accordingly, abandoning those projects for which the economic value is no longer
justified. Anchoring, however, may prevent managers from abandoning those projects in
a timely manner. Holding feedback constant, the higher the initial expected future value
of an innovation, the greater the adjustment that is needed for the managers to identify the
real value.
In the light of the above, anchoring and insufficient adjustment tend to lead firms
to stick to their prior expectation even when the signals are unfavorable and thus fail to
terminate projects that are no longer justified. This applies to firms‘ innovation strategies;
the managers‘ initial expectation of the usefulness of an innovation will impact their
decisions between termination and persistence. The higher the initial expectation of an
innovation, the more likely the managers will tend to keep it.
Hypothesis 3:
The higher the initial expectation of an innovation is, the less likely the innovation
will be abandoned.

Initial expectation

-

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 4

The remaining hypotheses are mostly based on the real option reasoning, which
suggests that the higher the variance of the future returns on an innovation, the more
valuable the growth opportunities embedded in the innovation. This is analogous to stock
option pricing. When the downside loss is fixed, firms‘ investments increase in value
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with increase in variance of returns, which means that the firms can access a greater
range of potential upside outcomes. As Dixit (1992) pointed out, the upside potential to
produce future earnings is actually the primary force that governs abandonment decisions.
Therefore, innovations that have high variance in future returns should be more valued
from a real options theory perspective, while such innovations are less valued using
conventional approaches.
There are various types of factors from different sources impacting a technology‘s
value, including the adoption and diffusion of new technologies, market and customer
acceptance, and competitors‘ strategic actions (Rosenberg, 1996). In this study I identify
and study four factors that influence the value of a firm‘s innovations: explorativeness of
innovation, scope of application, firm‘s knowledge depth and knowledge
complementarity. The first two factors are technology specific, and the latter two describe
a firm‘s knowledge portfolio effect.

III. 1.3. Technological uncertainty (explorativeness)
As novel recombination of knowledge elements, innovations are characterized by
significant uncertainty on the technology side. Technological uncertainty is an important
aspect of uncertainty that innovations are faced with. When firms generate new
innovations, they do not know for sure how useful the innovations may become in the
future. I examine the explorative degree of innovation to denote the uncertainty of the
return on the innovation from technological sources.
Innovations differ in the degree to which they are explorative: some innovations
are oriented to employing and refining existing technological solutions, and other

44

innovations are more oriented to seeking new technological alternatives. They represent
exploitation and exploration respectively as illustrated in March (1991). As exploitative
innovations refine existing solutions, they conserve cognitive effort and resources and
can lead to more predictable outcomes. There may even be the impulse to build on
existing problem solutions in the context of innovation in general (Ahuja and Lampert,
2001). Explorative innovations, however, have less predictable future returns.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests
that firms typically make decisions in a manner that limits uncertainty. Therefore, when it
comes to innovation strategies, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that firms are
inclined to keep exploitative innovations and abandon explorative ones.
Hypothesis 4a:
The more explorative an innovation is, the more likely it will be abandoned.

Explorativeness

+

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 5

Real options theory, however, suggest the opposite: technological uncertainty
increases the value of an innovation because higher uncertainty means higher growth
option value. Explorative solutions to a problem are more risky than exploitative ones
that build on technological antecedents (Hoskison, Hitt, and Hill, 1993; Hoskison, Hitt,
and Ireland, 1994). However, experimenting with new solutions may lead to radically
different innovation that is highly useful and fuels additional applications.
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Explorativeness thus implies an increase in the variability of outcomes; it can result in
failure but could also result in a significant breakthrough (Fleming, 2002).
Thus, higher explorative degree implies higher growth option value of an
innovation. But it may take more time for the innovator as well as the market to
recognize the true value of explorative innovations than for the exploitative ones. When
the potential of an explorative innovation is unclear, waiting for further discoveries about
the innovation has positive value. Therefore a firm will be inclined to keep such an
innovation rather than abandon it in order to avoid losing the potential growth
opportunities.
Hypothesis 4b:
The more explorative an innovation is, the less likely it will be abandoned.

Explorativeness

-

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 6
I expect that H4b is more likely to be consistent with actual managerial behaviors,
because the upside potential is the primary force that governs abandonment decision for
ongoing investments (Dixit, 1992). It would be very interesting to see whether actual
managerial behaviors reflect the behavioral theory or real options theory. If Hypothesis
4a is supported, it shows that the descriptive behavioral theory is true but managers make
suboptimal decisions. If Hypothesis 4b is supported instead, it suggests that we need to
question the degree to which behavioral theory reflects managerial decision making.
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III. 1.4. Scope of application
Scope of application is another technology specific characteristic of an innovation.
A technology may be applied in more than one type of product or activity. Here I define
scope of application as the degree to which an innovation can be leveraged in multiple
products or activities. An innovation‘s scope of application may positively affect the
variance of return on an innovation for three reasons.
First, a technology with a wide scope of application can be deployed in multiple
products or activities simultaneously and thus generate higher return in total for a firm.
Second, and relatedly, such a technology is a relatively more generalizable asset, thus it is
more likely to be able to be leveraged by other firms at the same time. Therefore, in
addition to leveraging the technology itself, the firm may also generate revenue by
licensing the technology to other firms. Third, there are embedded switch options. As
Moore (1994) suggests, ―Many times the pioneering innovation is primitive, initially
serves a specialized niche, and the most important use may not be the one envisioned.‖
Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) also show that generalizable assets produce more salvage
value than specialized assets. When the innovated technology does not prove to be highly
valuable in the originally desired use, the firm can still apply this technology in other
fields, though it may need to end the original usage. As a result, an innovation with wide
scope of application entails some flexibility for the firm, which is very valuable under
uncertain circumstances according to real options theory. Therefore, an innovation with
wide scope of application has higher growth option value, and a firm is more willing to
keep it when information about the full value of the innovation is limited.
Hypothesis 5a:
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The wider the scope of application of an innovation is, the less likely it will be
abandoned.

However, there are also difficulties that managers will have to value and to really
reap the benefit of application scope. To realize benefits from a wide scope of application
may require additional coordination as well as complementary resources including
technological knowledge, making such a task challenging and costly. Firms are limited in
their knowledge breadth (Ahuja & Katila, 2002) so they may lack the ability to capture
the marginal benefits from wider application scope of innovations. Although innovations
with wide application may entail greater flexibility with embedded switch options, firms
face obstacles in managing the switch options to harvest the flexibility benefits (Kogut,
1989; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Huchzermeier & Cohen, 1996, Tong & Reuer, 2007).
Therefore, the firm that owns the technology and other firms may not be able to really
exercise the embedded growth opportunities and reap the growth option value. Also, it
can be complicated and costly to utilize the innovation in multiple products and activities
so that the potential gains will be offset or even over weighted by the cost. Thus because
of the firms‘ bounded rationality and limited resources including information processing
capability we reach an alternate hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5b:
The wider the scope of application of an innovation is, the more likely it will be
abandoned.
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Figure 7

III. 2. Firm level factors
This section builds on real options theory while also bringing in other theory
background, the Resource Based View and in particular, the Knowledge Based View and
dynamic capability arguments. In addition to the innovation specific factors discussed
above, firm differences may impact abandonment decisions. Because firms are
heterogeneous in their resources and knowledge, each firm may perceive the value of an
innovation quite differently. As Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo (1997) proposed, the
heterogeneity of firms‘ abandonment decisions should be of particular interest to strategy
researchers. Folta & O‘Brien (2007) have suggested that an examination of firm
resources provides the basis for enlightening this heterogeneity. Guler (2007a) also found
that firm level differences are significant predictors of firm actions, especially in
unsuccessful investments.
I examine how a particular type of resource, a firm‘s knowledge portfolio,
impacts its innovation abandonment decisions. KBV suggests that the key resource of a
firm is its bundle of knowledge assets, and that the firm can build competitive advantage
through the effective management of such knowledge assets (Grant, 1996; Kogut and
Zander, 1992). Firms develop and apply knowledge in multiple technological areas, and
engage in multiple R&D projects. Because firms integrate and deploy their knowledge to
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create value, the return a firm can generate from its innovations is thus associated with
the firm‘s pool of knowledge.
The dynamic capability literature also suggests that a firm‘s knowledge asset
positions not only shape the firm‘s competitive advantage, but also impact the
accumulation of the dynamic capabilities of the firm (Helfat, 1997; Teece et al, 1997).
This further supports the argument that when firms evaluate their innovations, they
should not only examine the technological content in the focal innovation itself, but also
consider the firm‘s other resources especially its knowledge assets. The firm‘s current
knowledge asset will therefore impact the firm‘s evaluation of the innovations, its
investment in resource development and its R&D trajectory, and its innovation
abandonment decisions.
This logic leads to another advantage of using real options theory as compared to
conventional theories. Conventional theories based on cash flows typically assume
independent evaluation of investments. Thus, those approaches ignore the joint effect of
investments on future return but treat the value of investments as largely additive
(McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). Real options theory perspective, however, allows interactions
between investments. For example, Vassolo, Anand and Folta (2004) observed that there
are potential sub-additive or super-additive interactions among real options investments
due to redundancies in outcomes and fungible inputs respectively. In the following I
identify two characteristic traits of a firm‘s knowledge portfolio that impact the variance
of return on an innovation for a firm: knowledge depth and knowledge complementarity.
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III. 2.1. Knowledge depth
I define knowledge depth as the degree to which a firm develops and accumulates
knowledge within a specific technological area. By technological area, I refer to a
technological domain in which the technologies share a similar function, use or structure.
A firm‘s knowledge depth in a technological area can increase the variance of the return a
firm can generate from its innovations in that area for the following reasons. First, a
firm‘s innovations in areas where it has developed deep knowledge are likely to be more
valuable than those in areas it is unfamiliar with. As the firm develops deeper knowledge
in a technological area, it can better value new knowledge in that area. With familiarity
and deeper understanding, the firm‘s ability to use the knowledge to innovate improves
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Studies have shown that highly valuable innovations can derive
from the new synthesis of well-known components (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Sahal, 1985;
Utterback, 1994). Second, firms can better exploit their innovations in areas they are
familiar with as they build up complex knowledge and insight; a firm can reuse methods
or materials with greater efficacy (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Hoskisson et al, 1993).
Third, firms are more likely to further extend their innovations to areas in which they
have already accumulated substantial knowledge. RBV indicates that firms build their
capabilities on what they are especially good at. As firms construct and accumulate
knowledge through experience, their prior experience permits more efficient knowledge
accumulation in subsequent periods (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, 1994; Henderson & Clark,
1990). Helfat (1994) also found that firms tend to emphasize areas in which they have
accumulated knowledge in the past. Consistent with these arguments, the dynamic
capability view of the firm also suggests that deeper knowledge may facilitate both the
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learning and application of knowledge and thus the firm may better realize its absorptive
capacity to create or sustain its competitive advantage (Zahra and George, 2002).
Firms may perceive greater upside potential embedded in innovations in areas
where their knowledge portfolios show a high level of knowledge depth and are inclined
to keep such innovations. Therefore I have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6:
The depth of a firm’s knowledge portfolio in a technological area is negatively
related to the likelihood that an innovation in that area will be abandoned.

-

Likelihood of
abandonment

Knowledge depth

Figure 8

III. 2.2. Knowledge complementarity
Here I define knowledge complementarity as the degree to which the knowledge
in different technological areas can be usefully combined. Two technological areas do not
necessarily have to be close to each other in terms of technological specifics in order to
have high knowledge complementarity. Rather, high knowledge complementarity
between two technological areas implies that synergy may be achieved by combining
knowledge components in these areas to generate valuable solutions. For example,
Fleming and Sorenson (2001) found that it is easier and more fruitful to combine certain
types of technologies than others.
I examine the complementarity of a firm‘s knowledge portfolio at the level of
technological area. If the knowledge in a technological area can be usefully combined
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with knowledge in other technological areas of the firm, then positive interactions are
likely between the innovations in that area and the firm‘s knowledge in other areas. By
tying the focal innovation with the firm‘s other technologies, it is likely that the firm can
develop products of higher performance or generate new technologies of higher value
than firms lacking the complementary technologies. Given an innovation, those firms
without such complementary knowledge will be less able to discern application
opportunities or fully exploit such opportunities. Firms with complementary knowledge
therefore can access a wider range of growth opportunities and create greater value,
which means greater absorptive capacity in the aspect of harvesting resources (Zahra and
George, 2002). From the perspective of RBV, Knowledge complementarity can lead to
competitive advantage as it meets the four criteria: valuable, difficult to imitate,
unsubstitutable and not all firms have it (Barney, 1991). The firm‘s innovations in such a
technological area thus tend to have a higher growth option value for the firm, making it
worthwhile for the firm to keep these innovations.
Hypothesis 7:
The higher the knowledge complementarity between a technological area and a
firm’s other technological areas, the less likely the innovations in that
technological area will be abandoned.

Knowledge
complementarity

-

Likelihood of
abandonment

Figure 9
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The following is a summary of the hypotheses (1-7) and theoretical bases.

Independent variable

Predicted impact on
likelihood to abandon

Level

Theory

H1

current earnings

-

innovation

Economic, Real option

H2

sunk cost

-

innovation

Behavioral

H3

initial expectation

-

innovation

Behavioral

H4a

explorativeness

H4b

+

innovation

-

H5a

scope of application

H5b

-

Real option
innovation

+
knowledge depth
knowledge
complementarity

H6
H7

Behavioral

Real option

-

firm

Behavioral
Real option

-

firm

Real option

Table 2. A summary of Hypotheses1-7

As shown in Table 2, Hypothesis 1 is derived from both traditional economics
theory and real options theory. Hypothesis 2 & 3 and Hypothesis 4a are based on
behavioral theory, and the rest of the hypotheses are from real options theory. I do not
claim that these theories are mutually exclusive. Rather, they address different aspects of
managerial decision making in business context. Therefore, a model that includes all
three perspectives should be better in predicting abandonment decisions than the other
models.
Hypothesis 1 addresses the economic rationale from conventional NPV approach,
which considers the NPV of an innovation but tends to under-estimate its potential value
in the future thus lead to type II error. I expect that a model with Hypotheses 1 through 3
will better predict abandonment decisions than a model with Hypothesis 1 only, as
Hypotheses 2 & 3 addresses managers‘ behavioral and cognitive biases. Such biases,
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however, may lead managers to over-estimate or under-estimate the innovation value and
cause type I and type II error. Further, a model with Hypotheses 4b through 7 added will
even better prescribe the actual decision making of firms‘ innovation strategies. This is
because by applying the real options perspective, managers can better judge the
innovation value that includes the value of embedded growth opportunities, and
overcome some of their behavioral biases.
These expectations are formalized in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 8:
The model that incorporates the current earnings, sunk cost and initial
expectation of an innovation has greater explanatory power on the likelihood of
abandonment than the model that considers the current earnings alone.

Hypothesis 9:
The model that incorporates the explorativeness, scope of application, knowledge
depth and knowledge complementarity has greater explanatory power on the
likelihood of innovation abandonment than the model that only considers the
current earnings, sunk cost and initial expectation.

CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
IV. 1. Research setting
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This study is interested in the cross-sectional variation in firms‘ valuation of
strategic investments and subsequent actions. The hypotheses pertain to the variation in
innovation abandonment decisions, and the factors that explain that variation. Therefore
the hypotheses entail the regressing of the likelihood of abandonment on the specified
factors. I use patent data to test the hypotheses in the setting of the global chemical
industry. The chemical industry is appropriate for study of firm innovation strategies for
the following reasons. Technological development is critical to the performance of
chemical firms, and firms in chemical industry proactively innovate to gain competitive
advantage. Chemical firms tend to aggressively patent their innovations and their patents
are regarded as effective and are widely and consistently used (Ahuja, 2000). Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) showed that while in some businesses patents may
not necessarily reflect a firm‘s technical knowledge and R&D activities, patents are an
especially important source of technological advantage in the chemical industry. Thus, in
this industry patents are a meaningful indicator of a firm‘s innovative output (Arundel &
Kabla, 1998; Levin et al, 1987).
Patent data are widely used in management studies, as there are many advantages
of using it. In addition to using patents as a measure of firm‘s innovative output,
researchers also use patent data to measure firms‘ search behavior (e.g., Katila, 2002;
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Patents are directly and closely related to innovativeness;
almost all major innovations are patented with very few exceptions. Patent data provides
a rich source of information for specific innovation, including identifying the technology
classification, the applicant, the inventor, and as well as providing indication of
knowledge development. And the data availability adds to its attractiveness as a data
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source. Patent data are readily available from national patent offices and other databases.
Another important advantage of patent data is that it represents an externally validated
measure of innovation (Griliches, 1990).
There are some well-documented limitations of the use of patent data (Cohen &
Levin, 1989), however. For example, not all innovations are patented. Firms may differ in
their propensity to patent their innovations (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990), and
this difference is more significant across industries than within. These problems can be
solved by a research design limited to a single industrial sector in which patents are a
meaningful indicator of innovation, as I have done here. By doing so, the researcher can
control for inter-industry differences in patenting propensity as the factors that affect
patenting propensity are likely to be stable within a specified intra-industry context
(Basberg, 1987; Ahuja, 2000).

IV. 1. 1 Patents as real options that provide potential returns
Firms proactively engage themselves in creating new technological innovations in
order to pursue competitive advantages. In many industries, firms resort to patent systems
to protect and exploit their property rights to such innovations. Firms can exercise their
patent rights in three ways: by litigating, licensing or leveraging (Teece, 1998).
Litigation is the enforcement of intellectual property rights. When the firm
holding a patent finds that the patent has been infringed, the firm can litigate by suing the
infringing firm for lost royalties and damages (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001; Somaya,
2003). Licensing, the second type of exercising a patent, is the partial sale of such
intellectual property rights (Gallini & Wright, 1990). A firm can license its patents to
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other firms for royalty payments, or cross-license the patent to other firms and receive in
exchange the other firm‘s technology (Grindley & Teece, 1997). The third type of patent
right, leveraging, is typically exercised through internal corporate venturing. Here the
firm commercializes these patents by developing and introducing new or enhanced
products into market on its own (Block & MacMillan, 1993).
Patents parallel stock call options in many ways. With a granted patent, a firm has
the returns from current uses and the exclusive right to benefit from the patented
technology in the specified period. While investors have the right to exercise stock
options by trading the stocks at exercise price, firms have the exclusive right to exercise
their patents rights through litigation, licensing or leveraging the innovated technologies
into products and services. The investments that are needed to exercise the patent rights,
i.e., to commercialize the patents, are analogous to the exercise price on the real option.
The patent holding firm has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise these three patent
rights. If the stock price does not exceed the exercise price, stock option holders will not
exercise their options but simply let the options expire. Similarly, firms holding patents
may choose to let the patents expire and abandon their patent rights, if they find that the
patent entails inadequate current earnings and growth potential. I treat patents as real
options in this study, consistent with prior research (e.g., Pakes, 1986; Teece, 1998;
Nerkar, Paruchuri and Khaire, 2007).
It is appropriate to regard patents as real options for the following four reasons:
First, there is significant uncertainty about the returns to the patented technology. The
value of a patent is revealed over time. Researchers have found that most patents are of
little value and only a small number of patents turn out to be very valuable. Although

58

firms apply for patents for those innovations they consider valuable, at the time of
application they do not clearly recognize the total potential of these innovations.
Therefore there is still substantial uncertainty about how much return the innovation can
bring even if the patent is granted (Pakes, 1986).
Second, one important feature of an option is the asymmetric pay-off distribution
to the investment: an option enables the holder to keep the upside potential but limit the
downside risk to the fixed option price. This is also true for the distribution of potential
returns to patents, which are asymmetric. Because holding a patent does not commit the
firm to follow-on commercialization activities, a firm can limit the downside risk to the
patent related fee and make decisions about commercialization later. Thus the firm
acquires the right to obtain exclusive return that can be substantial but control the
potential downside loss.
Third, related to asymmetric distribution of returns, the flexibility in subsequent
decision making makes patents an appropriate context to apply the real options
perspective. Firms do not have to decide from the beginning exactly how they are going
to commercialize the patent. Rather, they collect updated information and make a series
of decisions about whether they should keep the patent, and how they should make
sequential investments into the commercialization.
Fourth, patents can be regarded as real options since patents can have significant
upside potential that is not reflected in current earnings. A firm may be exercising some
patent rights and produce earnings, but in addition to these earnings, it is likely that these
patents may be used in other applications and lead to future growth. This upside growth
potential can constitute a large portion of the value of the patented innovation, especially
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when it is still in the early stage of technology development and there is still substantial
uncertainty about the future use. Even a patent that currently does not yield cash inflow
can still be highly valuable because it may be used in the future. Therefore,
conceptualizing patents as real options can capture the embedded value in patents while
traditional valuation approaches such as NPV tend to misjudge the real value of patents
by ignoring the future growth opportunities.
The literature on firm innovation has seen studies that operationalized real options
using patents. Pakes (1986) is among the first studies that see patents as firms‘
investment in R&D activities. Nerkar and his colleagues have conducted a series of
studies that examine firms‘ innovation strategies by treating patents as options. McGrath
and Nerkar (2004) considered a firm‘s second patent granted in a technological area as an
option for the firm to enter that area. Nerkar and MacMillan (2004) considered patents
real options that give the flexibility of deferment and provide potential competitive
advantage and superior rents. Nerkar, Paruchuri and Khaire (2007) proposed that patents
are options that give the holders the potential right but not the obligation to sue others. Li
and Hesterly (2006) also used patents as options for firms to make follow-on investments.
Patent data offer a rare opportunity to examine firms‘ investment abandonment
decisions. In many countries patents are protected for a specified period of time and it is
required that patent holders renew their patents periodically after the grant until the
statutory limit is reached (typically 15-20 years). At each renewal time, the firm will
decide whether to renew their granted patents according to their judgment of the value of
these patents. Either the assignee firm pays the maintenance fee and renews the patent, or
it abandons the patent. The United State patent system, for example, usually protects
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granted patents for 20 years. Since 1983, all US patents‘ assignees need to decide
whether to renew the patent at the end of the 3.5th, 7.5th, 11.5th years following the grant.
After the initial granting of the patent by the United States Patent and Trade Office, a
maintenance fee of $890 is required after 3.5 years, $2050 after 7.5 years, and $3150
after 11.5 years (as shown in Figure 10)1,2. Other countries such as France, Germany and
Britain have similar patent maintenance request (the European Patent Office requires
annual patent renewal).

Patent
granted

3.5yrs

abandon

abandon

renew($890)

renew($2050)

4yrs

4yrs

abandon

renew($3150)

Patent
expired

8.5yrs

Figure 10: U.S. Patent renewal decision

If the firm decides that the patented innovation is yielding considerable current
earnings or may lead to considerable growth opportunities, it is willing to pay the
maintenance fee and keep the patent in force. If a firm, based on information at hand,
decides that a patent has only quite limited value in terms of the sum of current earnings

1

The owner of a US patent has an additional six month grace period to pay the fee. The patent rights expire
after that unless reinstatement is granted. If a patent expires due to nonpayment of maintenance fee, the
owner may petition the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) for consideration to reinstate
the patent. Reinstatement may be granted if the firm can show that the failure to pay on time is unavoidable.
If reinstatement is granted, however, the patent owner needs to pay the maintenance fee plus an additional
surcharge for reinstatement. Reinstatement may also be granted if the late payment of maintenance fee is
unintentional, with a surcharge much higher than if it is unavoidable.
2

Effective December 8th 2004, the maintenance fee increases to $900 due at 3.5 years, $2300 due at 7.5
years, and $3800 due at 11.5 years.
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and potential future returns, it simply does not pay the maintenance fee and just lets the
patent expire. In other words, it abandons the patent and forgoes the embedded growth
options. Whether the firm chooses to renew or abandon the patent is thus based upon both
the current earnings and the growth option value of the patent.
If the firm renews a patent, the firm has the right to gain potential payoff from the
patent during the next period of time but does not have further obligations. In addition, it
gains the right to wait to decide whether to renew the patent later on. As information
about the patent value is revealed over time, this waiting can have positive value. If a
firm decides not to renew the patent, it abandons its exclusive right to the patented
technology forever. As both the maintenance fee and the abandonment decision are
irreversible, the firm needs to make the decision carefully. In this study, I do not try to
explicitly calculate the option value. Rather, I study factors that impact the perceived
value of the patents and examine how these factors are related to the patent abandonment
decision.
Most patents are applied for in the early development phase. Because of the nontrivial maintenance fee, and the management of patented innovation involving human
labor and financial costs, a firm will only keep those patents it highly values. Although it
may be argued that the amount of maintenance fee is not significant so that firms may
renew all their patents, the actual costs of maintaining patents may be much more
significant than the maintenance fee. Lowe and Veloso (2004) argued that there may be
significant organizational costs of maintaining patents such as monitoring and litigating
and internal management costs. They suggested that firms‘ patent abandonment decision
is a planned and structured process that involves attorneys, scientists and business
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development. Previous research also shows that firms consistently abandon some of their
patents. Schankerman and his colleagues found that more than half of all patents are
voluntarily abandoned by nonpayment within ten years of the date of patent application
(Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Cornelli and Schankerman, 1999). Lanjouw (1998) made
a similar observation. Pakes (1986) reported that fewer than 7% of patents are renewed
for full term and that in Germany the proportion is around 11%. Econometric studies
have confirmed that the patent renewal request influences the decision to patent and that
firms held more valuable patents longer (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986;
Schanderman, 1998; Lanjouw, 1998). In this study I choose to examine the first renewal
decision, where uncertainty about the total return is most significant. My focus is not the
amount of renewal fees as hurdles but the conditions that lead to firms‘ abandonment
decisions.

IV. 1. 2 Extant literature on patent abandonment
There are a limited number of preceding studies on patent abandonment and
renewal in the literature. Most of them examine issues of policy effectiveness and are
concerned with the improvement of social welfare. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), for
example, argued that differentiated patent lives can be better than a uniform patent life in
terms of social welfare. They suggested that patent renewal fees can be an incentive
device to implement a policy of optimally differentiated patent lives. Scotchmer (1999)
also discussed optimal patent length, but concluded that the patent renewal system is not
better than a uniform patent life. Some researchers use patent renewal data to
operationalize patent value. Among them, Pakes and Schankerman (1984) were the first
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to develop a deterministic model that uses patent renewal data to infer the value of patent
protection. Since then other studies have also used patent renewal data to estimate the
value of patent rights (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Sullivan, 1994; Pakes, 1986;
Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 1998; Schankerman, 1998). Pakes (1986), for example,
suggested that because the value of patented innovations is very disperse and highly
skewed, the use of a simple count of the number of patents either applied for or granted is
a very noisy measure of innovation value. He argued that renewal data can be very
helpful to measure the value of patents.
While the extant literature on patent renewal focuses on policy issues and patent
value estimates, which are measurable after the renewal decisions are made, there is a
lack of research on the patent renewal decisions themselves: how do firms decide
whether to renew or abandon their patents? Which factors influence their decisions?
Recent studies in strategic management start to examine these research questions and
provide insightful thoughts. Nerkar and MacMillan (2004) examined firms‘ patent
abandonment decisions by incorporating learning of the focal firms. Li and Hesterly
(2006) proposed that different rent-seeking goals of firms impact their patent
abandonment decisions. They found that at the industry level, firms focusing on
Ricardian rents should have a greater tendency to continue R&D projects and delay
abandonment decisions than firms focusing on Schumpeterian rents. Lowe and Veloso
(2004) found that search of new knowledge influences patent renewal. These studies,
however, are mostly limited to certain individual patent features and have not examined
the impact of firm specific characteristics. Therefore further research on patent
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abandonment is still needed to advance the understanding of the actual managerial
decisions.

IV. 2. Data and Sample
I choose the U.S. patents of firms granted in year 1994 and year 1995 in the world
chemical industry (4-digit SIC code 2800-2899) as the empirical setting of the study. The
literature has often seen studies using real options theory to examine firms‘ R&D in the
context of the chemical industry (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). By
choosing firms in one industry instead of multiple industries that vary in many aspects
including technology, I avoid the substantial inter-industry differences. Meanwhile, I
choose a relatively broad conceptualization of the industry by working at the 2-digit SIC
level. By doing so, I am still studying firms that are similar in technological knowledge
and related in term of R&D activities, which will improve the generalizability of the
findings.
I use U.S. patent data for all firms to maintain consistency, reliability, and
comparability, as patenting systems differ across nations (Ahuja, 2000). Doing so can
ensure that the patents studied face largely the same institutional environment. I include
the foreign firms in the sample to improve the generalizability of the findings. Firms that
are based in countries other than United States also patent their innovations they consider
important in the U.S.
I use the NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001) and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) public online database to collect
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patent data for all the firms. I use ―utility patents‖ only.3 I use COMPUSTAT to collect
data on firms‘ sales, cash, number of employees, and R&D expenditures. The unit of
analysis in this dissertation is the individual patent renewal and the associated content of
the patent, and the level of analysis is the firm.
The patent‘s grant date is used rather than the application date, as I am examining
how factors at the time of the renewal decision impact the likelihood of abandoning the
patent, and the abandonment decision has to be made certain years after the grant date not
the application date. Because I am interested in the cross-sectional variation in
investment valuation in this study, I examine patents that are granted in two years and
control for the year. The reason to include two years‘ versus one year‘s patents in the
sample is to have a sample of adequate size. By examining the abandonment decision of
these patents, I control the time to expiration date, which is one of the factors determining
option value in the Black-Sholes model. I choose to examine patents granted in year 1994
and year 1995 for the study. By choosing two years at least 13 years after the renewal
system was installed, I avoid any problems that may have occurred in the initial set up of
the system. Finally, the year 1995 is the most recent year that NBER has updated data
that allows the empirical study to be conducted. The official published NBER patent data
set include citation data made by patents granted in 1975-1999, which allows a four-year
window of forward citation examination for patents granted up to the year of 1995.
I first identify firms in the 2-digit SIC code ―28‖ that are traded in North America
in year 1994 and year 1995 using COMPUSTAT, as firm performance and other factors
3

Utility patents are any new and useful method, process, machine, device, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. In my sample I exclude plant patents (with initial P),
design patents (with initial D), reissued patents (with initial RE), reexaminations (with initial B) and other
non-utility patent documents such as statutory invention registration (SIR, with initial H). For most firms,
these non-utility patent documents account for a very small proportion of their total patent documents.
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that are needed for the analysis require that data base. Then I used NBER database to
check for patents from these firms that were granted in the year 1994 and 1995 and
dropped firms that do not have successful patent applications in those two years. (This is
because I am examining firms‘ patent abandonment decisions. Such firms do not need to
choose between renewal and abandonment for any 1994 or 1995 patents four years later.)
The data include 7394 patents, of which 3805 patents are granted to 90 firms in
year 1994 and 3589 patents granted to 90 firms in year 1995. After dropping observations
with missing data (NBER data set does not have the variable of originality for some
patents, and in COMPUSTAT the data of some firms‘ sales, R&D expenditure and/or
cash are missing), the final data include 7000 patents, of which 3582 are granted in year
1994 to 85 firms and 3418 are granted in year 1995 to 83 firms. The 7000 patents belong
to 91 firms from 5 countries: DNK (Denmark), GBR (Great Britain & N. Ireland), IRL
(Ireland), NLD (Netherlands) and USA4.

IV. 3. Measures
IV.3.1 Dependent variable
Patent abandonment
The dependent variable is whether a patent granted in year 1994 or 1995 is
abandoned or renewed at the end of the fourth year after the initial grant. A dummy
variable (abandon) is used: 1 if the patent is abandoned, 0 if renewed. I collect patent
renewal information from the electronic official Gazette published weekly on USPTO
website. In the Gazette USPTO gives notices of expiration of patents due to failure to pay

4

While the firms belong to 5 countries, the first inventors of these 7000 patents are more scattered, located
in 25 countries.
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maintenance fee and any applicable surcharge. In addition, I also check the Errata and
Erratum in the Gazette notices to incorporate the possible corrections announced by
USPTO on patent expiration.

IV. 3.2 Independent variables
Current earnings
I use the non-self citations received by a patent from the grant date onward to 4
years later as a proxy for the current earnings on the patent (nonselfcite), taking into
account the six month grace period. By non-self citations, I mean those received citations
from U.S. patents that are granted to other assignees. Patents may receive citations from
subsequent innovations patented by the same assignee (self-citations) and other unrelated
assignees (non-self citations). While there is no accessible means of collecting
information for a large sample study about the exact current earnings on a patent through
litigation, licensing and internal leveraging, the forward non-self citations of the patent
provide valuable information reflecting the current earnings of the patented innovation.
Many patent studies have found that the number of forward citations a patent receives
from subsequent patents is highly correlated with its technological impact as well as its
social and economic value (e.g., Albert et al, 1991; Trajtenberg, 1990). For most patents,
the bulk of their forward citations are received six years after grant (Jaffe et al, 1993). So
when the first renewal decision has to be made, a firm still cannot precisely value the
patent just by relying on the number of citations received (Nerkar and MacMillan, 2004).
However, these citations reflect the likelihood that litigation may take place, the patent
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may be licensed to other firms, and the holding firm may commercialize it into new
products during the prior four years and into the future. Scholars have argued that selfcitations and non-self citations have different meanings as the self-citations are related to
a firm‘s prior endeavors (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000; Bogner and Bansal, 2007). Thus,
the number of non-self citations received by the end of the four years can be used to
proxy for of the patent‘s current earnings.

Explorative degree
To measure the explorative degree of a patent (explore), I use the measurement
formula that Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson (1997) developed to measure the
originality of a patent.
(2)

Explore= 1-nijS2ij

where Sij is the percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to technology class j,
out of the total number of technology classes ni that the patent cites. The more original a
patent is, the more explorative it is.

Sunk cost
While the measure of current earnings (nonselfcite) described above uses citations
received from subsequent U.S. patents granted to the focal firms, I use self-citations
(selfcite) to proxy for sunk cost that is already invested in the deployment of the focal
patent. It is difficult to accurately measure the resources firms have invested in each of
their innovations for a large sample study. Furthermore, such information may be
unavailable to researchers for business confidential reasons. The self-citations of a patent
offer an opportunity to approximate sunk cost that is associated with the patented
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innovation, as self-citations manifest the financial resources and other resources such as
managerial attention and R&D efforts the firm has devoted to the focal innovation, and
such resources once invested typically cannot be reversed. In addition, self-citations also
signal the technological trajectory underlying the deployment of the innovation. They are,
hence, a type of sunk cost related to the deployment of the focal patent, although not the
sunk cost used to create the focal patent. When the first patent renewal decision is made
only 4 years after the grant, higher sunk cost may make a firm tend to renew the patent to
gain more time for more favorable signals to be revealed. I calculate the number of a
patent‘s forward U.S. patent citations that belong to the same firm from the grant date
onward to 4 years later.

Initial expectation
I proxy initial expectation of a patent‘s value with the number of claims a firm
made according to the front page of the patent (claims). The inventor of a patented
innovation makes claims on his or her innovation when applying for patent. These claims
appear in their own section of the patent. Tong & Frame (1994) pointed out that during
litigation proceedings, the claims made by the firm help to explain what is non-obvious
and non-trivial. The number of claims of a patent reflects a firm‘s a priori perception of
the usefulness and potential value of the patent.

Scope of application
I use the number of classes that the patent is assigned (clsno) by the USPTO to
measure the scope of application of a patent. The more classes into which a patent is
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classified, the more likely the patent can be applied broadly. Some researchers suggested
that three-digit-level patent classes are too broad and that patent subclasses should be
used (Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005). However, other scholars have argued that class
level classification is more reliable and can be used with greater confidence (Henderson,
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 2005). I follow the latter researchers because the subclass
classification utilized in U.S. patent system is not nested thus using the number of
subclasses can lead to biased conclusion. I collect this variable directly from the public
website of USPTO.

Knowledge depth
I measure the knowledge depth of a firm in a technological area (depth) with
backward citation data. This use of backward citations to measure firm knowledge is
consistent with other studies that have used patent backward citations as a measure of
knowledge held by a firm (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). I define a technological area
consistent with the U.S. patent classification, using patent class to represent a
technological area. I look at all backward citations a firm‘s patents make, and calculate
how many times the firm cites patents in a patent class. The more a firm cites from a
patent class, the more it accumulates insight and knowledge in this technological area
(Katila, 2002). Although there are studies using patent backward citations to measure a
firm‘s knowledge, to my knowledge this measurement of a firm‘s knowledge depth using
backward patent citation is new. I collect backward citation data for a five year period
(1989-1993 for patents granted in 1994, and 1990-1994 for patents granted in 1995) to
capture the bulk of the firm‘s knowledge accumulation. This five year window is used
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rather than the entire patent stock of the firm because technological knowledge
experiences loss with time. The use of a five year window is consistent with prior studies
such as Fleming (2001) and Ahuja & Katila (2001). This measure is natural-log
transformed to reduce the skewness of the data.

Knowledge complementarity
The knowledge complementarity between a technological area and a firm‘s other
technological areas (comple) is measured using the citations the patents in one class made
to and received from the patents in the other classes in which the firm has patents granted.
The past citations between technological areas imply the degree to which value can be
created by combining the knowledge from those areas. Fleming and Sorenson (2001)
suggested that some technological areas are more linked to each other than other areas
and combining knowledge components from these areas are more likely to lead to
valuable solutions. Based on that logic, I operationalize the measure of knowledge
complementarity by using the entire U.S. patent history in the period year 1975 through
1998, and using the following formula:
j

comple =  (citeij+ citeji),

(3)

where i represents the primary class the focal patent is in, j is the number of the firm‘s
other patent classes, citeij is the number of patents in class i that cite patents in class j, and
citeji is the number of citations that patents in class i receive from patents in class j. The
patent history before year 1975 is not used as NBER data does not include patent citation
information prior that year. This, however, should not be a problem as 24 years‘ patent
history should capture the bulk of interdependencies between technological areas,
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especially when knowledge loss is considered. The information up to year 1998 is used
because it is the complementarity information prior to patent renewal decision that may
be used by firms to facilitate their abandonment versus renewal decisions. To reduce data
skewness, the measure is also natural-log transformed. If a firm does not have patents
granted in any other class, this measure is given the value of 0. This measurement of
knowledge complementarity using patent backward citations is unique. Although the
literature has addressed knowledge complementarity, especially the alliance literature,
many studies have coarsely operationalized it. Some studies used qualitative
questionnaires to quantify it, which may provide valuable insight as to managers‘
judgment. However, quantification of objective data is still needed to corroborate the
observation from questionnaires completed by managers. Plus, it is not feasible to get
managers‘ perception of knowledge complementarity for many refined technological
classes through survey for a large sample empirical study.

IV.3.3 Controls
Firm size
Firm size is controlled using a firm‘s annual sales (sales) (in millions). I lag this
variable by one year. The variable is natural-log transformed.

Financial resources availability
I control the financial resources availability of a firm by measuring its free cash
flow (cash). This variable is also lagged by one year and naturally logged. I expect a
positive impact of this variable on patent renewal. The more financial resources are
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available, the more likely a firm is to renew its patents, all other things equal. As
expected, preliminary analysis finds that firms‘ sales is highly correlated with firms‘ cash.
The correlation between these two variables in the sample is as high as 0.8019 and is
highly significant. Including both variables in a regression model could lead to a
multicollinearity problem. To tackle this issue, I regress the cash measure on sales and
obtain a new variable orthcash, which equals to the residual of the regression. This new
variable is orthogonal to sales and used as the cash measure in the regression models.

Firm nationality
There are country differences that may affect a firm‘s patent abandon decisions. I
use a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm is from US or other countries (d_us). A
patent in the U.S. may be more important for a U.S. firm than a foreign based firm.

Pharmaceutical firm or not
Pharmaceutical firms may be biased toward keeping more of their patents granted
than other types of firm do due to the extremely heavy investment in R&D and the long
time required for R&D activities in this industry. I use a dummy variable (d_drug) to
control whether the firm is in the four-digit SIC 2834 pharmaceutical industry, 1 if yes, 0
otherwise.

Innovation orientation
I measure a firm‘s innovation orientation using its R&D intensity (rnd_int),
calculated as the firm‘s R&D spending over the firm‘s sales. I expect that the more a firm
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is innovation oriented, the more it builds competitive advantage on innovativeness, so it
may be more likely to keep its patents in force.

Diversification
I control for firm diversification using the number of 4-digit SIC segments it
reports sales in COMPUSTAT (seg_no). I expect that diversification positively impacts a
firm‘s likelihood to renew its patents as it may possibly apply the innovations in multiple
businesses.

Year dummy
As the sample include patents granted in year 1994 and 1995, I control for the grant
year by having a year dummy (d_1995). By doing so, I eliminate the possible
heterogeneity due to any undetected systematic differences between patents granted in
the two years.

IV. 4. Model specification
Logistic analysis is used to examine how the independent variables and the
control variables impact the likelihood a patent will be abandoned. The model is specified
as follows (showing dependent variable and independent variables only):

Logit(abandon)=β1*nonselfcite + β2*selfcite + β3*claims + β4* explore + β5 *clsno+
β6*depth + β7* comple + σ

(4)
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As the 7000 patents in the sample belong to 90 firms, regressions of patents
renewal without controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity will produce biased
findings. One possible consequence is that the regressions may artificially increase the
statistical significance level of the estimates of coefficient. To deal with this concern, I
cluster by firm when I run the logistic regressions. Doing so allows me to isolate the
patent abandonment likelihood from unobserved firm effects that could bias the
estimation.

CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS

Unless otherwise noted, all the patent related information is from the NBER
database. I use multiple data files in the NBER data set: PAT63_99, which is the main
NBER data set that includes all the utility patents granted from year 1963 through year
1999; CITE75_99, the citations file, which includes all citations made by patents granted
in 1975-1999; and the Compustat file, which contains the patent assignee information and
thus allows one to match and link out patents with firm data available in the Compustat
data base. I use SAS to merge these data and calculate all the independent variables
except for clsno, which is collected from the USPTO website. Then I merge these
variables with firm level data from Compustat and derive the control variables. After the
data merging with SAS code of more than twenty pages, I run the data analysis using
logistic regressions with STATA logit routine.
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V. 1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables and Table 4 gives the
correlation matrix. While the regressions only use orthcash but not cash, I include sale in
the descriptive statistics table in order to illustrate the original firm slack resource
information.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Observation

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1. abandon

7000

0.1267143

0.3326764

0

1

2. nonselfcite

7000

1.751143

3.159622

0

50

3. selfcite

7000

0.9338571

3.100276

0

50

4. claims

7000

13.44657

10.23448

1

134

5. explore

7000

0.4504804

0.2735831

0

0.9091

6. clsno

7000

1.961429

1.080922

1

8

7. depth

7000

4.082262

2.081432

0

7.364547

8. comple

7000

7.302482

2.443513

0.6931472

12.10537

9. sale

7000

8.670805

1.446928

0.0723207

10.43817

10. cash

7000

5.54363

1.519965

0.1475576

7.792349

11. orthcash

7000

-4.94E-09

0.9079949

-3.417985

2.953134

12. rnd_int

7000

0.0177293

0.0258944

0.0006946

0.5356074

13. seg_no

7000

2.824143

1.626001

1

6
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Table 4
Correlations

Variable

abandon

abandon

nonselfcite

selfcite

claims

explore

clsno

depth

comple

sale

orthcash

-0.0541

**

selfcite

-0.0444

**

0.1404 **

claims

-0.0547

**

0.1329 **

0.1006 **

explore

-0.0346

**

0.0271 **

0.023 *

0.061 **

clsno

0.0358

**

0.0075

0.0377 **

0.0533 **

depth

0.0288

**

0.056 **

0.0893 **

0.0087

-0.1413 **

-0.0667 **

-0.0406

**

0.044 **

0.0505 **

0.0039

-0.0766 **

-0.0049

0.5755 **

-0.0611 **

-0.0146

-0.0542 **

0.3429 **

0.1971 **

1

-0.0021

-0.0659 **

0.0399 **

0.1445 **

0.0615 **

0

-0.0069

-0.0652 **

0.0742 **

-0.0489 **

-0.0377 **

-0.3093 **

0.2204 **

-0.0041

0.0348 **

-0.0637 **

0.1816 **

0.0561 **

0.6431 **

-0.0883 **

sale

seg_no

1

nonselfcite

comple

rnd_int

0.038 **

1

0.0113

orthcash

-0.0305

rnd_int

-0.0093

0.0025

seg_no

-0.0132

-0.0084

**

0.0381 **

1

-0.0182
0.104 **
0.0013
-0.0335 **

1
1

0.1958 **

1

n = 7000 patents
** p<.05
* p<.1
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1
1

1
1

-0.2239 **

1

Table 4 provides the correlation matrix for all the variables. It shows that the
highest correlation between any two of the independent variables is r= 0.5755 between
knowledge depth (depth) and complementarity (comple), and the highest correlation
between any variables is r= 0.6431 between two control variables of firm size (sale) and
diversification (seg_no). All the other correlations are below 0.35. This level of
correlation indicates that problems of multicollinearity are unlikely to be manifested in
the data. Moreover, the table also shows a low level of correlation between the measures
of patent level characteristics: current earnings (nonselfcite), sunk cost (selfcite), initial
expectation (claims), and scope of application (clsno). This low correlation also suggests
that these measures capture distinctive dimensions of the value of a patent. To further
check whether there is multicollinearity issue with the variables, I calculate the VIF
(Variance Inflation Factor) of independent variables and control variables. Table 5
reports the VIF of these variables. The result shows that the data conform to the nonmulticollinearity assumption: the highest VIF is 2.01 and the mean VIF for all the
variables is only 1.32, both much lower than the generally accepted cut off value of 10
(Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, 2004).
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Table 5
Variance Inflation Factors
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

sale

2.01

0.496677

seg_no

1.75

0.570194

depth

1.7

0.586546

comple

1.51

0.662691

rnd_int

1.18

0.846977

orthcash

1.1

0.905669

original

1.08

0.929488

clsno

1.06

0.944926

selfcite

1.05

0.954439

nonselfcite

1.04

0.96247

claims

1.04

0.963427

Mean VIF

1.32

V. 2. Hypotheses Testing
Table 6 presents results of the logistic regression models of abandonment
likelihood. I provide seven models. All seven models are significant. All the models with
independent variable(s) have chi square above 24, and are highly significant (p< 0.0018
for Model 2, p < 0.0000 for all the other Models with independent variable(s)). Model 1
in Table 6 is the base model that comprises only the control variables. Model 2 adds the
variable for Hypothesis 1, current earnings. Model 3 contains the predictor variables for
Hypotheses 2 and 3, sunk cost and initial expectation. Model 4 includes the predictor
variables of uncertainty, scope of application, knowledge depth and knowledge
complementarity. Model 5 and 6 are the nested models of Model 2 & 3, and Model 2 & 4
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respectively. Model 7 is the full model that includes all the independent variables and
control variables to test the impact on patent abandonment likelihood.
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Table 6
Logistic Regression Models of Abandonment Likelihood
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

-0.0748

Nonself citations

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-0.0604

***

0.0269

Model 6

**

0.0257

Self citations

-0.0821

Number of claims

-0.0161

-0.0727

-0.4585
0.1360

-0.4226

**

0.1237

0.1351

****

0.1280

****

-0.1253

Cash

0.2285

0.2272

0.2363

-0.3900
0.1431

****

0.1394

****

-0.1243

0.0301

0.0299

0.2332

0.2176

0.1574

0.1574

0.1561

0.1439

0.1566

0.1438

0.1430

-0.1114

-0.0974

-0.1344

-0.0966

-0.1303

-0.1181

0.1342

0.1348

0.1363

0.1250

0.1364

0.1253

0.1268

R&D intensity

1.4928

1.4153

1.1792

0.8747

1.1506

0.7746

0.4659

2.5875

2.5602

2.5592

2.6811

2.5463

2.6553

2.6354

Diversification

-0.1711

-0.1797

-0.1726

-0.1845

-0.1789

-0.1921

-0.1905

US firms

-0.7191
0.2903

0.2820

0.2789

0.2715

0.2728

0.2618

0.2540

Drug firms

-0.2186

-0.2268

-0.2386

-0.2633

-0.2379

-0.2707

-0.2789

0.3535

0.3424

0.3581

0.3368

0.3485

0.3261

0.3312

0.0518

-0.0004

0.0413

0.0562

0.0015

0.0047

0.0058

0.1072

0.1080

0.1057

0.1048

0.1070

0.1057

0.1054

Year 1995

Constant

-2.7907

0.1370
**

**

1.1747
Chi square
Log likelihood

15.04

-0.7186

-2.7121

0.1368
**

**

1.1630

**

-2632.98

Log likelyhood improvement vs. the
base model

24.56
-2619.88
13.1

-0.6867

-2.4841

0.1337
**

**

1.1607

***

71.99

-0.6850

-2.3678

0.1350
**

**

1.0771

****

-2614.93

47.04
-2598.81

18.05

34.17

-0.6912

-2.4525

0.1309
**

**

1.1542

****

75.01
-2606.77

-0.6968

-2.2947

-2.0352

50.41

128.69

-2586.49

-2572.18

Note: The table gives parameter estimates; the robust standard error is below each parameter estimate.
**** p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.10
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**

-0.6805

1.0493

26.21

46.49

****

****

0.1296
***

1.0651

****

***

0.0383

-0.1166

0.1401

*

0.0481

0.0380

0.0301
0.2447

***

0.2119
***

0.0478

0.0383
-0.1276

Knowledge complementarity

**

0.2150
***

0.0479
Knowledge depth

*

0.0057

0.2239
Number of patent classes

**

0.0435
-0.0149

**

0.0058

Explorativeness

-0.0587
0.0253

0.0489
-0.0140

***

0.0062

0.2345

***

0.0265

-0.0703

0.0521

Firm size (sale)

-0.0729

Model 7

60.8

***

*

****

Model 1 tests the effects of control variables on the likelihood to abandon a patent.
Only the country dummy variable is significant, having a negative effect on abandonment
likelihood, suggesting that patents belonging to U.S. firms are much more likely to be
renewed. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Lowe & Veloso, 2004) and makes
intuitive sense as technological innovations patented in U.S. are more important for U.S.
firms than for foreign based firms. All the other control variables do not have significant
impact on patent abandonment (after clustering by firms). These effects of control
variables largely remain in the subsequent models.
Hypothesis1 predicts a negative relationship between current earnings and the
abandonment likelihood. In Model 2, the coefficient for the non-self citations is negative
and significant, supporting the hypothesis. This estimation is consistent in Model 5
through 7 (in the full Model, βnonselfcite= -0.0587, p< 0.05), offering strong support for
Hypothesis 1. This finding is consistent with findings from prior research (Nerkar &
MacMillan, 2004).
Hypothesis 2 predicts that sunk cost reduces abandonment likelihood. The
coefficient for the self-citations in Model 3 and Model 5 are negative but not significant.
In the full model, the coefficient for self-citations is negative and significant at p< 0.1 (p<
0.95, very close to the non-significant level). Thus hypothesis 2 only receives partial
support. This finding is slightly different from prior research. Nerkar & MacMillan
(2004), for example, found a strong negative relationship between self-citations and
patent abandonment (p< 0.01 in all their models). Li & Hesterly (2004) also found that
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firms tend to keep patents with high percentage of self-citations for a longer period of
time than those patents with low percentage of self-citations.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that initial expectation will negatively impact the patent
abandonment likelihood. The parameter coefficient for claims is significantly negative in
Model 3 at p< 0.01 and Model 5 at p< 0.05, and also the full model at p< 0.001. This
result offers strong support for Hypothesis 3. This finding is consistent with Li &
Hesterly (2004), who found that the number of claims of a patent delay the abandonment
timing.
Hypothesis 4 regards the impact of innovation explorativeness on patent
abandonment. While the behavioral theory of firm predicts a positive impact on patent
abandonment likelihood (Hypothesis 4a), real options theory predicts the opposite
relationship (Hypothesis 4b). In all the Models that contain this variable, i.e., Model 4,
Model 6 and Model 7, the parameter coefficient for explorativeness is negatively
significant. In the full model, βexplore = -0.39, at p< 0.1. These results offer strong support
for the hypothesis from the real options perspective (H 4b) but not for the hypothesis
based on the behavioral theory of the firm (H 4a).
Hypothesis 5a proposes that the scope of application for a patent reduces the
abandonment likelihood thus a negative coefficient for the number of classes is expected,
and Hypothesis 5b predicts the relationship to be of an opposite sign. Contrary to
Hypothesis 5a expectation, the parameter coefficient for this variable is significant but
has the opposite sign: it is positive at a highly significant level in all the models that
include this variable. In the full model, for example, βclsno= 0.1431 at p< 0.01. Thus
Hypothesis 5b receives support but not Hypothesis 5a. This finding is also only partially
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consistent with prior studies. Nerkar & MacMillan (2004), for example, found that the
scope of a patent is not significantly associated with patent abandonment likelihood.
Hypothesis 6 predicts that a firm‘s knowledge depth in a technological area
decreases the likelihood that patents in that area will be abandoned. Thus a negative
coefficient for knowledge depth is expected. Contrary to this expectation, knowledge
depth is significant but has the opposite sign: the parameter coefficient for knowledge
depth in all the models that contain this variable (Model 4, Model 6, and Model 7) is
positive at a highly significant level, i.e., p< 0.001. In the full model, βdepth= 0.1394. This
result suggests that, the more a firm develops knowledge in a technological area, the
more likely the firm tend to abandon rather than renew its patents in that area.
Hypothesis 7 proposes that the higher the knowledge complementarity between a
technological area and a firm‘s other technological areas, the less likely the innovations
in that technological area will be abandoned. Consistent with this expectation, the
coefficient for knowledge complementarity in all the models that include this predictor
variable (Model 4, Model 6, and Model 7) is negative and highly significant. In Model 7,
βcomple = 0.1243 at p< 0.001. The result provides strong support for this hypothesis.
I use the Wald test, which approximates the likelihood ratio test, to examine the
improvement in explanatory power for nested models. Model 2 is enhanced over Model 1,
(likelihood improvement = 13.10, chi square= 7.70, p< 0.01), suggesting that including
the number of non-self citations as a predictor variable significantly improves the
explanatory power with the control variables only. Similarly, Model 3 and Model 4 also
have obtained enhanced explanatory power over the base model (Model 1) by including
the predictor variables based on the behavioral theory and real options theory (likelihood
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improvement = 18.05, chi square= 19.03, p< 0.0001; likelihood improvement = 34.17,
chi square= 32.81, p< 0.0000). Hypotheses 8 and 9 regard the model fit and improvement
when the behavioral theory of the firm and the real options perspective are considered.
Hypothesis 8 proposes that adding the effect of sunk cost and initial expectation, we can
better predict the likelihood that an innovation will be abandoned. Hypothesis 9 suggests
that the incorporation of the explorativeness, scope of application, knowledge depth and
knowledge complementarity can further improve the model fit for innovation
abandonment likelihood. Model 5 is nested within Model 1 and tests Hypothesis 8. The
Wald test result shows that this model has significantly enhanced explanatory power over
Model 2 by introducing the variables from the behavioral theory (self-citations and
number of claims) (likelihood improvement = 13.11, chi square= 16.79, p< 0.001). This
result thus provides support for Hypothesis 8. Model 7 is nested within Model 5 and tests
Hypothesis 9. The Wald test result shows that this full model has obtained explanatory
power over Model 5 by further introducing the variables from real options theory
(explorativenss, number of classes, knowledge depth and complementarity) (likelihood
improvement = 34.59, chi square= 34.47, p< 0.001). This result offers support for
Hypothesis 9.
I also examine a model with predictor variables based on NPV and real options
theory, Model 6, which is nested with Model 2. Compared to Model 2, this model is of
better fit (likelihood improvement = 33.39, chi square= 2.26, p< 0.000), suggesting that
considering the effect of variables based on real options theory enhances the explanatory
power on abandonment likelihood than the model with NPV variable only.
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Comparing all the models conducted, Model 7 (the full model) has the greatest
likelihood improvement and explanatory power as shown by the Wald test. Therefore, it
is the best-fit model.
Table 7 presents the results for Model 7 with odds ratios reported.

Table 7
Results for Logistic Regression on Abandonment Likelihood
(Model 7 Odds Ratios Reported)
Odds Ratio

Robust Std. Err.

[95% Conf.

Interval]

nonselfcite

0.9429847

**

0.0238907

0.8973033

0.9909916

selfcite

0.9298793

*

0.0404372

0.8539075

1.01261

claims

0.9851839

***

0.0056297

0.9742114

0.9962798

explore

0.6770455

*

0.1434513

0.446958

1.025579

clsno

1.153852

***

0.0554638

1.050109

1.267844

depth

1.149625

****

0.043978

1.066582

1.239134

comple

0.8831327

****

0.0263631

0.8329445

0.936345

sale

1.243063

0.1778046

0.93916

1.645307

orthcash

0.8885819

0.1126731

0.6930495

1.139281

rnd_int

1.593467

4.19945

0.0091007

279.006

seg_no

0.8265812

0.1071394

0.6411429

1.065654

d_us

0.5063418

0.128592

0.3078012

0.8329469

d_drug

0.7565967

0.2505842

0.3953186

1.448044

d_1995

1.005787

0.1059977

0.8180878

1.236552

**

Note:
****p< .0001
***p< .001
**p< .05
*p< .10

To acquire more intuitive explanations of the implications of the parameter
coefficient estimation, I also calculated the marginal effects on the probabilities of the
independent variables of the full model. By using the Stata command of mfx, those
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marginal effects in the probabilities are calculated when the dependent variable is at its
mean value. Table 8 reports the marginal effects on the patent abandonment probabilities
of the predictor variables.

Table 8
Marginal Effects on Abandonment Likelihood
Variable

dy/dx

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[ 95%

C.I. ]

nonselfcite

-0.0060152

0.0027

-2.22

0.026

-0.011314

-0.000716

selfcite

-0.0074492

0.00437

-1.71

0.088

-0.016008

0.00111

claims

-0.0015295

0.00063

-2.45

0.014

-0.002755

-0.000304

explore

-0.0399628

0.022

-1.82

0.069

-0.083089

0.003163

clsno

0.0146632

0.00444

3.3

0.001

0.005967

0.02336

depth

0.0142872

0.00431

3.32

0.001

0.005841

0.022733

comple

-0.0127342

0.00267

-4.77

0.000

-0.017963

-0.007506

0.022294

0.01543

1.45

0.148

-0.007945

0.052533

orthcash

-0.0121039

0.01271

-0.95

0.341

-0.037011

0.012803

rnd_int

0.0477394

0.27013

0.18

0.86

-0.481703

0.577182

seg_no

-0.019515

0.01392

-1.4

0.161

-0.046794

0.007764

d_us*

-0.0888401

0.03766

-2.36

0.018

-0.162657

-0.015023

d_drug*

-0.0274631

0.03165

-0.87

0.386

-0.089496

0.03457

d_1995*

0.0005913

0.01079

0.05

0.956

-0.02055

0.021733

sale

Note:
1. Marginal effects after logit
y = Pr(abandon) (predict)
= .11589616
2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

This table suggests that when the dependent variable (abandonment likelihood) is
at its mean value, an additional non-self citation reduces the likelihood to abandon the
patent by 0.60% (i.e., it is 0.60% more likely to be renewed); an additional self-citation
reduces the abandonment likelihood by 0.74%; an additional claim decreases the
abandonment likelihood by 0.15%; an additional unit of originality reduces the likelihood
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that the patent will be abandoned by 0.39%; an additional number of class the patent is
classified into boosts the abandonment likelihood by 1.47%; an additional unit of
knowledge depth increases the abandonment likelihood by 1.43%; and an additional unit
of knowledge complementarity increases the renewal likelihood by 1.27%. If a patent
belongs to a U.S. firm, it is 8.88% more likely to be renewed than if it belongs to a
foreign based firm.
Table 9 provides a summary of the hypotheses testing results.
Table 9
Summary of Hypotheses Test Result

Independent variable

Predicted
impact on
abandonment
likelihood

current earnings

-

Theory
Economic, Real
option

sunk cost

-

Behavioral

partial support

initial expectation

-

Behavioral

support

+

Behavioral

no support

-

Real option

support

-

Real option

no support

+

support

-

Behavioral
Real option

opposite sign (+)

-

Real option

support

explorativeness
scope of application
knowledge depth
knowledge
complementarity

Findings
support

model fit improved by incorporating behavioral theory

support

model fit further improved by incorporating real otpions theory

support
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION

The principal purposes of this research are to explore whether firms make
abandonment decisions in accordance with real options theory, and the relative strength
of the traditional economic theory, the behavioral theory of the firm and real options
theory in explaining firms‘ abandonment decisions. I developed and tested a set of
hypotheses in the context of firms‘ decision making concerning innovation abandonment.
The results from the empirical analyses provide evidence that taking a real options
perspective improves the explanatory power of firms‘ investment abandonment decisions
and thus increases our ability to understand as well as predict such managerial decisions.
My study suggests that, 1) firms‘ actual innovation abandonment decisions are consistent
with the predictions made from real options theory; and 2) a real options perspective
provides better explanation of firms‘ abandonment decisions than traditional economic
theory and the behavioral theory of the firm.
Research has shown that competitive success often requires firms to make
abandonment decisions in a timely manner. However, traditional approaches to decision
making are not adequate to help firms make abandonment decisions: conventional NPV
models tend to undervalue investments and thus lead to premature terminations of
projects that have positive potential; in addition, behavioral biases introduce noise into
the firms‘ investment valuation process and thus their abandonment decisions. As a result,
organizations sometimes make abandonment decisions that appear inappropriate. Many
studies in the past few decades have looked for evidence and the cause of inappropriate
abandonment decisions. However, relatively few studies have examined how firms can
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eliminate the biases in making their abandonment decisions and improve such decisions.
The traditional economic theory is normative, but unrealistic to use given the many
complications and limitations in actual managerial decision making. The behavioral
theory is descriptive in describing what is actually occurring, but does not provide insight
into what should be done. In this dissertation I suggest that real options theory may be
used to enhance our understanding of firms‘ actual abandonment decisions. While my
findings show that real options theory offers better explanatory power of firms‘ actual
abandonment decisions, they lead us to the next critical step for future research: what is
the prescriptive potential of this theory in enhancing managerial decision making?

VI. 1. Three theories as reflected in the data
The empirical results show that all three theories, traditional economic theory, the
behavioral theory of the firm and real options theory are reflected in the data. Hypothesis
1, which is based on traditional economic logic and consistent with real options theory,
receives support, suggesting that firms do consider the current earnings from assets in
place. But this predictor variable does not dominate the decision making of abandonment.
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5b also receive support, suggesting that the behavioral theory of the
firm perspective is reflected in the data and we can conclude that managers exhibit
behavioral biases in abandonment decisions. More specifically, the logistic regression
results suggest that, all things being equal, higher initial expectations and sunk costs both
make a firm tend to continue the investment. Regarding the impact of uncertainty,
Hypothesis 4b based on real options theory receives strong support, but not Hypothesis
4a, which is based on behavioral theory. This suggests that firms do not exhibit the
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uncertainty avoidance bias as predicted by the behavioral theory of the firm in their
abandonment decisions, at least in the context of patented innovation renewal. Firms
value the explorativeness thus the uncertainty of innovations rather than simply trying to
circumvent it by giving little chance to innovations that carry high levels of uncertainty.
We can conclude that adopting a real options perspective may help firms eliminate this
uncertainty avoidance bias. Hypotheses 4b through 7 except 5b are based on real options
theory. The results show evidence that a real options perspective is reflected in
managerial decision making for abandonment decisions: in addition to the current
earnings of the investment, firms also consider the growth option value embedded in the
investment. More specifically, results suggest that the explorativeness and technological
scope of innovations, and the firm‘s knowledge portfolio are associated with the firm‘s
innovation abandonment decisions.
As traditional NPV models cannot capture the value of embedded future growth
opportunities, the NPV models are conservative in the valuation of investments,
especially those with high levels of uncertainty. Firms that rely on such models to
evaluate their investments and make investment decisions accordingly inevitably fall into
the trap of underestimating their strategic investments. As a result, such firms do not
invest enough in growth opportunities that are explorative thus uncertain but with high
potential in the future as they should (Kougut and Kulatilaka, 1994). The real options
reasoning, however, can recapture some value lost through the NPV valuation by adding
in the value of growth options. The NPV valuation captures a base estimate of value of
assets that are currently in place, and the option valuation adds in the value of the right to
decide whether to pursue investment opportunities in the future. Therefore, taking a real
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options perspective may help firms to be more willing to invest in explorative activities.
The empirical data indicate that in the actual decision making of firms, managers
consider factors beyond the NPV valuation models. This suggests that real options theory
can help explain why firms sometimes pursue exploration activities, which cannot be
fully explained with the NPV models.
The results suggest that firms exhibit behavioral biases due to insufficient
adjusting and sunk cost. The data show that firms are not prone to abandoning
innovations that carry high levels of uncertainty, in accord with the real options
perspective. In the full model, the biases due to initial expectation and sunk cost are still
present. However, the impact of sunk cost is at a relatively low level of significance and
is significant in only one model, although very close to the 0.1 significance level in the
other models. This suggests that firms exhibit only some of the behavioral biases in
abandonment decisions.
An important result of the study lies in testing the relative strength of each model
in predicting decision outcomes. It is important to note that this study does not propose
real options theory as a replacement of either traditional investment valuation models
such as NPV or behavioral theories as explanations for abandonment decisions. Rather, a
real options approach provides a complementary perspective, taking into consideration of
uncertainty, information asymmetry and path dependency. The comparison between the
model based on NPV only and the model based on both NPV and the behavioral theory
of the firm supports Hypothesis 8, showing that these two theoretical perspectives are not
mutually exclusive to each other. The enhanced model fit suggests that the incorporation
of the behavioral theory improves the explanatory power of firms‘ abandonment
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decisions over the conventional NPV model. Hypothesis 9, which further compares the
model based on NPV and behavioral theory and the model that incorporates all three
theoretical perspectives, is also confirmed, suggesting that taking a real options
perspective further improves the explanatory power. In addition, further comparison of
the model that only contains predictor variables based on real options theory and models
that also incorporate current earnings from NPV and the full model shows that the full
model provides the ―best-fit‖ model.
What is particularly interesting is that managers seem to behave according to all
three theories. The results suggest that when making abandonment decisions, firms
consider the current earnings as suggested by NPV models, exhibit some behavioral
biases, and also utilize real option reasoning. Taking a real options perspective does not
eliminate or lessen the significance of the other two theories (with the exception that
firms value innovation explorativenss in accord with real options theory instead of
circumventing explorativeness as predicted from behavioral theory). This shows that real
options theory is not exclusive to the traditional economic logic or behavioral theory.
Rather, the finding that the full model offers the best fit suggests that real options theory
can act as a framework that ties together the other two theories. By taking the real options
perspective and incorporating the other theories, we can have a better model to predict
firms‘ strategic abandonment decisions.
The findings of this dissertation also confirm an argument that has recently
captured academic attention in real option studies: firms manage a portfolio of real
options, which may interact with each other and thus should not be evaluated in isolation
(Vassolo et al, 2004; Anand et. al, 2006). In these studies, Vassolo, Anand and their co-
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authors show that under different conditions multiple options can be sub-additive or
super-additive. In this research, I also find that a firm‘s knowledge depth and knowledge
complementarity significantly impact its patent abandonment decisions. This finding
provides support that a firm‘s options are not independent from each other; therefore the
valuation of its investments should consider the path dependent accumulation of
resources and capabilities. Otherwise, investment decisions made based on isolated
valuation will lead to overinvestment or underinvestment by ignoring the interrelations
among investments.
It is important to note that in the context of strategic management, real options
theory should be viewed as a decision tool rather than a valuation tool that is used to
precisely estimate the value of investments. Unlike the well-defined financial options, the
option pricing models such as the Black-Scholes Model cannot readily be used on
complex business projects. It is impossible to get the exact risk and opportunities profile
for strategic options on real assets. It can be extremely hard to find appropriate values for
the input variables. MacMillan (2006) pointed out that for sequential investments such as
firms‘ R&D, the value of a sequence of options is not strictly additive. In addition, the
financial option pricing models do not differentiate the uncertainty source. For example,
financial option pricing models including the Black-Scholes Model suggest that higher
uncertainty means higher option value. For real options, however, the uncertainty from
the side of costs will penalize rather than add to the growth option value (MacMillan et al,
2006). Therefore, when managers adopt a real options perspective and use real options
reasoning to facilitate managerial decision making, they cannot use option pricing models
mindlessly.
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Fortunately, though it is impossible to apply straightforward option pricing
models to calculate the exact value of a strategic investment, firms often do not need to
have a precise valuation for a specific project. As Putten & MacMillan (2004) pointed out,
―Simple and quick is what‘s needed for most valuations…‖. Often the relative valuation
of the firm‘s investments is what managers need to know. Porter (1996) has noted that
―Strategy is making trade-offs in competing.‖ By comparing the valuation of multiple
investment projects that compete for the firm‘s limited resources, managers are able to
decide whether a given investment opportunity is preferable to other investment
opportunities. Then they make investment decisions and allocate resources accordingly.
As strategy is about resource allocation under conditions in which the resulting
performance is not clear, real options theory can provide a very insightful perspective.

VI. 2. Two significant results opposite to real option prediction
Two significant opposite results deserve further discussion. First is the lack of
support for the proposed negative impact of patent application scope on abandonment
likelihood as in Hypothesis 5a. Contrary to the real option expectation but consistent with
the behavioral theory argument, the scope of application of a patent significantly
increases the likelihood that the patent will be abandoned. This result also contradicts
with the findings of many extant studies that argue that patent scope or breadth is
positively associated with the valuation of the patent or the innovator‘s profit function.
Lerner (1994) for example, found that the breadth of patent protection significantly
positively affects firm valuation. McGrath & Nerkar (2001) found that firms are more
likely to further invest in new R&D activities in technological areas in which their first
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patents are wider in scope. Shane (2001) also found that patented innovations of wider
scope are more likely to be commercialized through new firm formation. All these studies
utilize the number of patent classes to operationalize the patent scope.
This finding suggests that managers may be biased in the evaluation of innovation
scope. Two potential explanations exist for this finding in addition to the difficulties that
managers may have in their valuation of innovation scope as discussed in the hypotheses
development. First, it may be that when making innovation abandonment decisions,
managers do not consider the positive potential because of the application scope of
patents. This leads us to question the optimality of managers‘ decisions: are they making
decisions that lead to the best result? While the real options reasoning helps us better
predict managerial decisions in other aspects examined in this study, should it be
prescriptive regarding patent scope in abandonment decision making? Given that prior
research has found that scope is valuable for innovations, it is likely that using a real
options reasoning here may result in better performance. Future research is needed to
examine whether applying real options reasoning in this respect, i.e., retaining patents of
wide application scope for a longer period, will lead to results better off for firms.
Second, it is possible that technology may be different from other types of assets
in that the generalizability of a technology does not always add to its value potential.
Instead, there may be a trade-off between the generalizability and the specialization of a
technology such that a more generalizable technology has lower potential than a
specialized technology. Thus, unlike physical assets, generalizable technology on average
may be less valuable than specialized technologies. As Table 4 shows, the class number
of a patent is not significantly correlated with the non-self citations received and the
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coefficient is small, suggesting that other firms may not value the patent scope on
average. The table also shows a positive correlation between patent scope and selfcitations, suggesting that the assignee firm may perceive higher potential of the patent
and commit more resources to capture the potential. However, it is questionable that any
significant growth opportunities are actually embedded and the firm may really reap the
growth option value. Still, this finding suggests that further exploration with the refined
implications of innovation scope will be necessary and fruitful. For example, future
research may use the international patent classification instead of the U.S. classification
to measure patent scope and compare the findings.
The second significant opposite result is the lack of support for proposed negative
relationship between a firm‘s knowledge depth in a technological area and the likelihood
the firm will abandon innovations in that area. Contrary to Hypothesis 6, I find a
significant positive association between knowledge depth and abandonment likelihood.
This suggests that firms do consider the degree to which they have accumulated
knowledge in the technological area. While deeper knowledge allows a firm to better
evaluate the potential of innovations, a potential explanation for this finding is that with
greater knowledge depth, firms are more acute in realizing the limitations and shortfalls
of the innovations. While deep knowledge may allow firms to perceive higher potential
of certain innovations, it may also enable firms to recognize that certain innovations are
limited in the possible exploitation and further extension. Given the fact that most
innovations are incremental in improvement over currently available solutions and only
have insignificant value, greater knowledge depth can enable firms discern innovations
that do not pose high potential. In addition, deeper knowledge in an area also implies that
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the firm has more solutions (thus more options) available in that area so that the marginal
gains of new solutions is relatively less, and the firm will be more cautious in having
more options in the area. In addition, having new options implies the firm may need to
divert resources from current options thus the value of current options decreases
(McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Therefore greater knowledge depth makes firms become
stricter with the valuation of innovations in the technological area rather than the opposite,
helping firms abandon such innovations more ruthlessly. To conclude, this opposite
finding does not imply that the real options argument is not reflected in the data. Rather,
it actually offers evidence that managers act in accord with the real options reasoning by
considering the future potential of the innovations, only that deeper knowledge helps to
better screen innovations that are less promising.

VI. 3. Additional findings
A closer look at the results regarding scope of patent application and patent
claims also reveals some important and interesting insights. Past research on patents often
use two types of measures for patent scope, the number of patent classes or subclasses,
and claims of patents. From a theoretical point of view, a patent‘s number of classes and
claims reflect different aspects of the patent. Which class or classes a patent is assigned
into is determined by the patent examination officials and thus is externally validated.
The claims are made by the inventors prior to the patent grant, as an ex ante estimation
based on the inventors‘ judgment of the inventive contribution. In the U.S., claims appear
on the main page of the patent identified with the lead words: ―I claim….‖. The patent
claims thus represent the initial expectation of the patent value before the patent grant
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process as anticipated by the inventors rather than the patent officials. This comparison
suggests that a patents‘ number of classes is more appropriate as an objective measure for
its scope. The correlation between the two variables as shown in Table 4 is only 0.0533
(p<0.05). In the logistic regression models on patent abandonment likelihood, the
coefficient signs for the two variables are also opposite: while the number of claims is
consistently negatively associated with the abandonment likelihood in the reported
models, the class number is positively related with the likelihood to abandon the patent.
This further confirms that the number of claims does not capture the same component of
application scope as does the number of patent classes.
The findings regarding self-citations and non-self citations are also worth
discussion. The correlation between the two variables is low, 0.1404 (p< 0.05) and they
have different effects on patent abandonment likelihood. While non-self citation
consistently has a significant negative impact on abandonment likelihood, self-citation is
only significant in the full model at a low significance level. This confirms the argument
that self-citation and non-self citation have different meanings and that researchers
should be aware of this when using patent citations in research. The finding also suggests
that at least in the context of innovation abandonment, firms do not exhibit strong bias
because of sunk cost.
In order to better understand these findings, I compared them with Li & Hesterley
(2006) and Nerkar & MacMillan (2004). Both used empirical settings different from my
study. Li & Hesterley (2006) only examined patents that are abandoned, either in the first
renewal round (at the end of the 4th year) or those patents renewed in the first round but
abandoned in the second renewal round (at the end of the 8th year). They sampled patents
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granted to U.S. manufacturing firms (SIC between 2000 and 3999) in 1995 and
abandoned in 1999 or 2003. Then they looked at the relationship between their predictor
variables and the timing the patents are abandoned. Nerkar & MacMillan (2004) only
sampled patents granted in 1995 and in the pharmaceutical classes of 514 (Drugs) and
424 (Bio affecting compositions) as defined by USPTO. They looked at how the
experiential learning and learning from others influences the patent renewal decisions,
individually and jointly. The use of different dependent variables and the sample
selection difference between my study and these studies may explain the partial
consistence of the findings.

VI. 4. Implications
The findings in this dissertation suggest that real options factors are significantly
considered in making abandonment decisions. The real options variables utilized in this
study help to assess the value of the focal innovation in a more comprehensive way than
if only current earnings are considered. As the full model offers the best fit, we can
conclude that real options theory provides a framework of broader perspective that can
incorporate NPV, behavioral theory and the future growth potential of investment when
there is considerable uncertainty.
Researchers argue that the real option lens sheds economic insight onto the flaws
in the behavioral processes that emerge in many firms, and offers guidance for better
strategic decision making (McGrath et al, 2004). The findings of a strong and significant
relationship between real options variables and abandonment decisions suggest a need to
empirically investigate the relationship between real options reasoning and abandonment
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decision outcomes. Thus the findings suggest further research opportunities. By
empirically testing for the ―best fit‖ model from among the alternative perspectives, we
are only able to discern the best explanation for what is actually happening in firms‘
managerial decisions, not what the optimal decision should be. Future study can advance
further and examine the prescriptive potential of real options theory in strategic
management by testing whether utilizing real options reasoning significantly improves
decision making quality. For example, future research can look at whether firms should
be more careful when abandoning innovations with wide scope and retain those
innovations for a longer period of time.
The results of this study also have several other theoretical implications. First, this
study has implications for real options research. It shows that managers use a real options
perspective to help them decide when to change course. So far the majority of real
options research in the field of strategy focuses on the initiation of new projects, which
are viewed as the adoption of new options. Little research has been conducted on firms‘
implementation of real options perspective over time, such as the evaluation of
previously acquired options and the decision to exercise or the decision to abandon. In
fact, because abandonment decisions have been considered to be desperate and
uncommon management decisions (Porter, 1976), the examination of abandonment
decisions remains largely an unexplored territory in strategy research. In addition,
regardless of the considerable scholarly attention and the promising potential of real
options theory in strategy research, empirical study is still rather limited (McGrath and
Nerkar, 2004). Especially, so far we still lack empirical evidence as to whether managers
revise strategic decisions and abandon investments in accordance with real options theory.
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By demonstrating how firms decide to terminate innovations in accordance with real
options perspective, this study provides further support for and advances real options
theory in the context of strategic management.
Second, this study has implications for RBV and dynamic capability research.
Firms undertake investments to develop and deploy their resources. Firms‘ dynamic
capabilities involve not only the ability to incorporate certain processes into ongoing
routines but also the ability to leave out certain processes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
However, most RBV research has focused on resource development and redeployment,
and relatively few studies have examined how firms make discontinuation decisions,
which are more complex and subjective than the decisions to continue. This study
provides insight into how firms evaluate their investments and decide which to abandon,
which is directly linked to the continuous development and renewing of firms‘ dynamic
capabilities. Therefore this study helps to explain the sources of heterogeneity of
organizational capabilities and to build a more dynamic resource-based view (Helfat &
Peteraf, 2003). For example, research found that firms may fall into competency traps
when favorable performance with an inferior procedure leads a firm to accumulate more
experience with it thus keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make
it rewarding to use (Levitt and March, 1988). Such competency traps may cause firms to
fail to conduct exploration or accumulate experience with new procedures. Real options
theory, however, suggests that managers may appreciate the future growth potential of
explorative procedures and conduct further experimentation and thus reduce the
likelihood of falling into competency traps. Further, it is important for firms to both
engage in exploring activities and also discontinue those projects and ventures that no
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longer entail high potential early and cheaply to cut losses in time (McGrath et. al, 2006).
This study shows that the real options perspective can shed insight on the balance
between exploring projects and timely abandonment.
Third, this study shows that in the context of strategic management real options
theory can be usefully tied with other strategy theories. In the development of hypotheses
concerning the impact of knowledge depth and complementarity on firms‘ innovation
abandonment decisions, I build my arguments based on real options theory and also other
theories such as RBV, KBV and the dynamic capability view of the firm, taking into
consideration of certain firm level factors. By combining the real options perspective
with established strategy research we can apply real option reasoning to examine a wide
range of strategic management issues and practices. For example, tying real options
arguments with firms‘ resource development, accumulation and deployment, the learning
aspect of knowledge and the development of organizational dynamic capabilities, we can
gain new insights in firms‘ assessment of investment projects, their decisions concerning
investment in resources and their R&D trajectory. In the mean time, linking real options
theory with other strategy theories also furthers the advancement of real options theory.
Fourth, it has implications for the innovation literature. Although the innovation
literature has seen widespread attention to firm patents and patent characteristics, renewal
or abandonment decision making so far remains a topic that is rarely explored. Thus, this
study advances the understanding of managing an innovation portfolio by trimming the
low value ones and keeping the promising ones. Specially, this study analyzes and tests
how technological uncertainty impacts firms‘ innovation abandonment decisions. This is
an essential feature of technological innovations but is inadequately addressed in
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innovation literature. Past research has measured macroeconomic uncertainty by
calculating the variance of indicators such as exchange rates (Campa, 1993), inflation and
output prices (Huizinga, 1993); or industry-specific uncertainty as reflected in the
volatility of sales (Kogut, 1991), stock market returns (Folta and Miller, 2002) or GDP
contributions (Folta and O‘Brien, 2004). Relatively few studies explicitly examine the
uncertainty a firm faces from technological sources. Although Folta (1998) proposed to
examine technological uncertainty, empirically he operationalized the measure using
stock market returns rather than examining the technologies themselves in a more direct
way.
Fifth, this study has implications for research on the management of firms‘
sequential investments. A firm‘s multi-stage projects require regular assessment and
revision if necessary. This study expands our understanding of firms‘ revision of their
investment decisions. Although the empirical test of this dissertation is conducted in the
setting of innovation portfolio management, the same reasoning can apply to the
valuation of multi-stage projects of other types. For example, the venture capital business
is an appropriate context where uncertainty is high and the capability to terminate lowpotential projects is critical. We can expect that by adopting a real options perspective
and considering factors associated with the projects‘ future potential such as uncertainty
and interactions among the firm‘s other business investments, we can better predict
firms‘ investment continuation and abandonment decisions.
This study also has managerial implications for practitioners as it illustrates the
impact of a series of factors on abandonment decisions. Managers may make use of the
findings to facilitate the valuation of their ongoing investments, including innovations.
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Specifically, they should make sure to consider the growth potential embedded in firms‘
investments in addition to current earnings, especially the positive potential rooted in
uncertainty and the interactions between the focal investment and the firms‘ other
investments.

VI. 5. Limitations and future research
This study also has several limitations. Although a single industry research design
helps to alleviate the inter-industry differences, the generalizability of the findings to
other industries is questionable. Replication of the research in other industries and
different time frames is desirable. Industry characteristics may matter to the extent that
real option reasoning is used. Industries vary in their reliance on patents. In industries
where patents provide effective protection of technology, firms appropriate a significant
portion of the value of their innovations. Therefore, firms can consider the total value
potential of innovations for the society when making abandonment decisions. When the
patent system and legislation provide weak protection from value appropriation by the
firms with innovations, the firms need to consider the spillover variation. In using the real
option lens, they need to consider the portion of upside potential that they may possibly
appropriate, rather than the total potential of the innovation for the society. The impact of
institutional environmental factors in other industries can be studied.
This study only examines the first renewal decision. Future studies can examine the
subsequent renewal decisions, when more information is revealed and uncertainty
resolves with time. The comparison of the decisions in these stages is going to be
interesting. Future research can be extended to conduct longitudinal studies to examine
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how the change in a firm‘s resources and capabilities influence its decisions. Studies can
also examine whether those patented innovations renewed in the first round but
abandoned later are worth the delay, what is the optimal timing of abandonment, and
whether the real options argument may help firms make the abandonment decisions
earlier without losing much of the growth option value.
This study raises a lot of interesting future research questions. The most important
question is to further explore whether real options theory improves managerial decision
making quality and lead to better performance. Although this study uses proxy for a
firm‘s a priori perception, it does not perfectly capture the influence of escalation of
commitment and other psychological factors. Future research can employ questionnaires
to detect the impact of such factors and further rule out these influences. To look more
closely, it is desirable to use surveys to test whether managers conscientiously use real
option reasoning to evaluate investments and make the abandonment decisions or they do
this sub-conscientiously. Future studies can also consider the possible interactions
between the variables examined in the study and other variables at the patent level, firm
level or industry level.
In this study I only examine the effect of uncertainty from the technological
source, which is originated in the innovation generation process, leaving out the other
possible types of uncertainty. Future studies can consider the impact of uncertainty from
other sources, such as market demand, ownership structure, product market focus,
technological relevance, and nationality or geographic locations.
It is possible that firms tend to rely on real option reasoning to a greater extent in
some situations than in others. I suspect that firm strategy, structure and resources are
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likely to impact the extent that real option reasoning is used in organizational context. For
example, we can question whether exploration-oriented firms are more likely to make
innovation abandonment decisions in accord with real options theory. Competition and
institutional factors may also impact the likelihood that real option reasoning is used. For
example, does competitive rivalry positively moderate the use of real option reasoning,
because growth option value is more valued when competition is intense? The
characteristics of the top management team may also have influence on when growth
option value is more recognized and emphasized. It is fruitful to conduct research on
those contingencies under which the real option reasoning is more likely to be used.
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